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ESSAY
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVACY IN A
SPLINTERED SUPREME COURT
DAVID M. SMOLIN*
The United States Supreme Court's dramatic decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey' underscores and exacerbates deep divisions within the
Court and the nation regarding abortion, implied fundamental rights, and
the role of the judiciary in a constitutional republic. Indeed, the opposition
and controversy engendered by Roe v. Wade2 and efforts to overrule Roe
were a major theme of the opinions. The joint opinion of Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter referred six times to the controversy created by Roe.'
In the end, the joint opinion relied upon this controversy as a reason for
reaffirming the "central holding" of Roe.4 Justice Scalia's dissent, on behalf
of all four dissenters, underscored Roe's extreme divisiveness by repeatedly
comparing both Roe and the Casey joint opinion to Dred Scott v. Sandford.'
The Casey joint opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, claimed
that the Roe Court, and implicitly the Casey majority, were "call[ing on]
the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division
by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."6
No one seemed to be listening. Ironically, the loudest howls of protest
seemed to emerge from the abortion-rights community, which, ever since
the submission of the certiorari petition, had seemed committed to declar-
ing defeat in Casey.7 Despite Justice Blackmun's articulated judgment that
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University. The author
wishes to thank Tom Berg, Karen Bowdre, Paul Linton, Bill Ross, Scott Houser, and George
Wright for their review of and comments on prior drafts of this article.
1. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
., 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. Casey, 505 U.S. at ........ 112 S. Ct. at 2803, 2809, 2812, 2815, 2816.
4. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2814-16.
5. Id. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2876, 2883, 2885 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
6. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
7. See David M. Smolin, The Status of Existing Abortion Prohibitions in a Legal World With-
out Roe: Applying the Doctrine of Implied Repeal to Abortion, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 385,
385-88 (1992) (discussing abortion rights litigation strategy in Casey).
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the heart of Roe had been reaffirmed,8 the abortion rights political and legis-
lative strategy apparently mandated loud declarations that Roe had been
effectively overruled.9 Pro-life responses were more mixed. Advocates
were predictably upset over the Court's asserted reaffirmation of Roe but
were pleased that the Court had upheld most of the statutes."0 There was,
of course, no sign that pro-life advocates had finally "accepted" Roe as a
"common mandate rooted in the Constitution."
The Supreme Court came within one vote of an explicit overruling of
Roe v. Wade. On the other hand, the acceptance of much of Roe by three
Reagan-Bush appointees suggests the possibility that a modified form of
Roe will remain indefinitely. Underlying these uncertainties are important
questions about the doctrines of substantive due process and privacy."
Would the overruling of Roe signal the wholesale abandonment of the doc-
trines of substantive due process and privacy? Is the partial reaffirmation of
Roe a signal that the Court will extend privacy to adult consensual sexuality
and overrule Bowers v. Hardwick?2 What are the legitimate jurisprudential
roots of privacy? How can the doctrine of implied fundamental rights be
made consistent with the limited role of the judiciary in a constitutional
republic? Is Roe v. Wade merely a logical extension of the Court's previous
privacy cases? What kinds of philosophical, jurisprudential, or ideological
presuppositions are represented in the Justices' various views of privacy?
The following analysis will not settle these questions to the satisfaction
of all. Hopefully, however, the philosophical, ideological, and historical
analysis of the various views of privacy and liberty will clarify what is at
stake in this continuing jurisprudential controversy.
8. See Casey, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
9. See, e.g., Don't be Fooled: Roe v. Wade is Dead, N.Y. TiMEs, July 1, 1992, at A16 (Planned
Parenthood ad).
10. See USA TODAY, June 30, 1992, at 4A.
11. The recent retirement of Justice White, however, removes one of the four votes to over-
rule Roe.
This article will use the terms "substantive due process" and "right of privacy" more or less
interchangeably. This use is based on this author's perception that the right of privacy is the
application of substantive due process to a particular sphere of human life. It is interesting that
the joint opinion in Casey largely refrained from using the terms "fundamental right" or "pri-
vacy," while repeatedly using the terms "liberty" and "substantive due process." The joint opin-
ion thus analyzed the abortion right directly as a part of the doctrine of substantive due process.
Casey, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2791.
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
[Vol. 75:975
1992] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVACY
I. THREE THEORIES OF PRIVACY
A. Introductory Considerations
The current case law on privacy presents many uncertainties and para-
doxes. It is difficult to reconcile Justice White's majority opinion in Bowers
v. Hardwick13 with Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.14
The Court has protected the use of contraceptives by the unmarried"5 and
by minors16 without according the same protection to the underlying sexual
acts. 7 Some privacy claims, such as those pertaining to parental rights and
midwifery, have been rejected by the judiciary and virtually ignored by the
Supreme Court"8 despite Supreme Court language suggesting that they lie
at the heart of privacy. 9 The current uncertainties regarding the future of
Roe add yet another imponderable to an already confused picture.
The uncertainties and paradoxes of privacy appear to result from an
underlying struggle between three theories of privacy. One group of Jus-
tices, historically including Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and
Stevens, has viewed privacy as protecting the value of individual auton-
omy. 20 A second group of Justices, historically including Black and Rehn-
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. ., 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
15. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). It should be noted that Baird was decided based
on "rational basis" equal protection analysis, and thus, at least technically does not extend to the
unmarried a "fundamental right" to use contraceptives.
16. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
17. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96 (rejecting claim that consensual adult homosexual sodomy
is a fundamental right in part because it would require the invalidation of other laws proscribing
consensual adult sexuality; see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (rejecting the view that
providing the right to unmarried minors or adults to use contraception necessarily includes rights
to engage in sexual activity).
18. See infra notes 187-210 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (finding that the right of privacy
protects choices regarding marriage, procreation, family relationships, childbirth, and childrear-
ing). Parental rights are included within both "family relationships" and "childrearing." Choices
regarding childbirth often occur in the context of a marriage relationship, involve the intimacies of
marriage and of family relationships, and are among the first childrearing decisions made by a
family. See, eg., Barbara McCormick, Childbearing and Nurse-midwives: A Woman's Right to
Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 683-93 (1983).
20. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, J.J.) (describing privacy in terms of individual autonomy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 209, 211-18 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in Roe and Doe) (Douglas employs autonomy
concept in describing his constitutional views.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 439,453 (1972)
(Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan has clearly stated that the entire text of the Constitution is about
"the relationship of the individual and the state. The text marks the metes and bounds of official
authority and individual autonomy." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
quist, would have preferred to reject the view that certain unenumerated
substantive due process rights are fundamental. These Justices would limit
substantive due process review to the minimal requirement that all legisla-
tion be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Some would
eliminate substantive due process completely. Either path leads to the elim-
ination of fundamental privacy rights.21 Finally, a third group of Justices,
including Justice White and the second Justice Harlan, views the privacy
right primarily as a way of protecting the traditional family from govern-
mental interference.22
The following sections will examine these three theories of privacy.
First, I will analyze privacy as individual autonomy. This view is held by
what is traditionally characterized as the liberal wing of the Court and was
recently partially endorsed by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
The liberal wing of the Court has made its views of privacy rather clear.
Thus, if Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens had been able
to consistently command a majority, privacy would clearly include a broad
abortion right,23 a broad right of adults to engage in consensual sexual
acts,2 4 and a broad right to die.25 The ability of these Justices to win the
votes of the swing Justices enabled the liberal wing to secure a broad abor-
21. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990) (majority
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95 for the proposition that the right to
refuse medical treatment is a liberty interest rather than a privacy right); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that abor-
tion is a liberty interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171-78 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
affid in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(applying liberty interest analysis to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting substantive due process).
Justice Black apparently viewed the Due Process Clause as entirely procedural, aside from its
role in incorporating the Bill of Rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, would see at least a
limited role for substantive due process in the evaluation of whether legislation is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government interest.
22. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-96 (White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court)
(adopting constitutional distinction between marital heterosexual activity and homosexual or
nonmarital sexual activity); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 545-46, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing marital intimacy from
homosexuality, fornication, incest, and adultery in the context of substantive due process).
23. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838-43, 2843-55 (opinions of Justices Stevens and Black-
mun); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens among a majority invalidating even minimal
regulation of abortion).
24. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Mar-
shall, JJ.).
25. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 301-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Black-
mun, JJ.) (Right to die through refusing artificial nutrition and hydration is fundamental.); id. at
330, 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Choices about death touch the core of liberty."). Neither of
these dissents states that the right of privacy includes the right to die. However, their use of
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tion right from Roe in 1973 through the apex of the abortion right in Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists26 in 1986. On
the other hand, the inability of this group of Justices to consistently com-
mand a majority led to the anomaly of Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986.27 As
these Justices retired and as the Reagan and Bush administrations ap-
pointed new Justices, Roe appeared increasingly anomalous. However, the
joint opinion in Casey suggests at least partial adherence of Justices Ken-
nedy, Souter, and O'Connor to privacy-as-autonomy, raising the question of
whether Bowers could be overruled.
This article will demonstrate that privacy-as-autonomy has been shaped
by a number of values beyond the mere embrace of individual choice. The
fatal flaw in analyzing privacy under Roe is that the judiciary used the Con-
substantive due process analysis and emphasis on the right to choose in matters relating to death
essentially bring them into the methodology of privacy-as-autonomy.
26. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
27. The swing Justices on privacy issues from the early 1970s through the middle of the 1980s
were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart. Chief Justice Burger dissented in two
of the Court's contraception cases, indicating that he would have upheld a variety of restrictions
on the distribution of contraceptives. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting without opinion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 465 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion in Roe, but wrote a
concurring opinion applicable to Roe and Doe arguing that the Court's opinion lacked the "sweep-
ing consequences" claimed by the dissenters. Roe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, J., concurring). By
1986, however, Chief Justice Burger had concluded that "some of the concerns of the dissenting
Justices in Roe... have now been realized." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). Therefore, the Court "should reexamine Roe." Id. at 785.
Chief Justice Burger also supplied a critical vote to the Court's five to four rejection of sodomy
as a fundamental right. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186. Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion
to "underscore" his view that "there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosex-
ual sodomy," declaring that such a holding would "cast aside millennia of moral teaching." Id. at
196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Justice Powell joined the Court after Roe, but strongly affirmed Roe's holding in his majority
opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983)-an opinion
which Chief Justice Burger joined. Justice Powell supplied a necessary fifth vote to the Court's
holding in Bowers, adding a brief concurrence suggesting that a prison sentence for sodomy
"would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell has, since leaving the Court, stated that his vote in Bowers was "probably...
a mistake," because Bower's holding is inconsistent with Roe. Anand Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says
He May Have Been Wrong; Powell on Sodomy, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3.
Justice Stewart dissented in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965), but later
joined the Court's opinion in Roe, stating in a concurring opinion that he now accepted Griswold
as one of a long line of substantive due process decisions. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Stewart supplied the necessary
votes, in combination with the Roe dissenters, to reject the abortion rights view that Roe demands
equal governmental funding of abortion and childbirth. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326
(1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment).
The vacillating views and votes of these swing Justices are the primary cause of the muddled
and confused state of the privacy case law from the early 1970s through 1986.
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stitution to promote a very particular and ideological set of extra-constitu-
tional values. If Roe were overruled in the ways proposed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, it might precipitate a conflict between no-
privacy theorists and those, whom I term "family sphere theorists," who
want to use the privacy right to protect the traditional family. The fate of
privacy would then depend upon the resolution of this conflict.
I will suggest that the true roots of privacy are found in certain implicit
constitutional understandings about the relationship between government
and the family. I will also suggest that the unfortunate misuse of privacy by
autonomy theorists should not be used as a basis to eliminate these implicit
understandings from our constitutional framework. Privacy, properly un-
derstood, is as necessary to the process of representative government and
the management of social conflict as are textual rights such as free speech.
Thus, the post-Roe era of privacy would hopefully involve the flowering,
rather than the decay, of the doctrine of privacy.
B. Privacy as Individual Autonomy
1. The Cheerful Existentialism of Privacy-as-Autonomy
A prestigious group of legal scholars and a significant number of
Supreme Court Justices have viewed the right of privacy as a vehicle for
furthering the value of individual autonomy."8 The term "individual auton-
omy" deserves careful definition. The term "individual" refers to individu-
alism, which is defined literally as either "a doctrine that the interests of the
individual are or ought to be ethically paramount," or "the conception that
28. See, e.g., Brief for a Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae, in support of
Reprod. Health Servs. [hereinafter Webster Briefi, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989). The above brief was on behalf of 885 American law professors. Its link to autonomy
theory is twofold. First, it reaffirmed Roe's "central holding." Webster Brief at 2. Second, the
briefs argument was conceptually an autonomy argument complemented by an equality argu-
ment. Thus, for example, the brief stated that the "essence of [the privacy right] is freedom from
governmental control over the diverse choices by which people crucially define their values and
shape their lives." Id. This language is reminiscent of Justice Blackmun's emphasis, in his Bowers
dissent, regarding the self-defining nature of choices about sexuality. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The law professors on whose behalf the brief was submitted include a
number of well-known professors, among which are: Bruce Ackerman, Barbara Allen Babcock,
Derrick Bell, Richard Chused, Walter Dellinger, Norman Dorsen, Susan Estrich, Daniel Farber,
Thomas Franck, Gerald Frug, Thomas Grey, Duncan Kennedy, Sylvia Law, Kristen Luker, Man
Matsuda, Martha Minow, Kathleen Sullivan, Laurence Tribe, Mark Tushnet, Lloyd Weinreb, and
Robert Weisberg. Frank Michelman and Norman Redlich are among the attorneys listed on the
brief. Law review articles and books analyzing privacy from an explicit or implicit autonomy
perspective are endless. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES
(1990); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
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all values, rights, and duties originate in individuals. 29 In legal discourse
individualism produces a tendency to reduce associations and groups, such
as families, religious communities, and nations, to mere collections of self-
interested individuals, with a corollary habit of analyzing issues of constitu-
tional law and political theory in terms of the struggle of the individual
against the state.3" The term autonomy is literally defined as "the quality or
state of being self-governing."3 The term derives from the Greek "auto"
for self and "nomos" for law, so that it can be literally defined as being a
law for, or unto, oneself.3 2 "Individual autonomy" thereby refers to the
individual as the self-governing source of law or rights.
The term autonomy more broadly connotes a view, derived perhaps
from a cheerful interpretation of Sartre's existentialism, that human beings
create and define themselves through their choices and acts; the relevant
slogan is that "existence precedes essence."33 Human beings, in other
words, are not limited or defined by any binding or higher authority,
whether it be God or nature.34 This view is coupled with an interpretation
of John Stuart Mill's theory of liberty which views the power of the state as
limited to the prevention of harm to the person or property of others,
thereby eliminating the authority of the state to legislate based on
morality.35
The existence of these strands of "individual autonomy" in the case law
and legal literature is easily documented. Justice Blackmun's eloquent dis-
sent in Bowers v. Hardwick, which represented the views of four Justices, in
itself reflects all of these themes. Consider the following excerpt:
The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases dealing
with various decisions that individuals are entitled to make free of
29. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 428 (3d ed. 1967).
30. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (redefining privacy cases about
family relationships as cases about individual choices); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (redefining Griswold's protection of marital intimacy as protection of the individual); Bren-
nan, supra note 20, at 439 (Entire constitutional text concerns the relationship of the individual
and the state and the bounds of official authority and individual autonomy.).
31. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60 (3d ed. 1967).
32. I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 807 (Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1969).
33. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM 15 (Bernard Frechtman trans., 1947).
34. See id at 27.
35. Professor George Wright. writing in the context of free speech principles, has noted that
Mill's writings rejected a broad view of individual autonomy associated with mere freedom from
restraint, libertarianism, and ethical relativism. See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE
SPEECH LAW 5-10 (1990). Thus, the view of governmental power commonly ascribed to Mill is
arguably a distortion of Mill's actual position. See, eg., Russell Hittinger, The Hart-Devlin De-
bate Revisited, 35 AM. J. JURIS. 47, 51-53 (1990) (Both Hart and Devlin misconstrue Mill by
ignoring Mill's substantive, developmental view of human flourishing.).
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governmental interference "bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that
is asserted in this case." While it is true that these cases may be
characterized by their connection to protection of the family, the
Court's conclusion that they extend no further than this boundary
ignores the warning... against "clos[ing] our eyes to the basic rea-
sons why certain rights associated with the family have been ac-
corded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause." We protect those rights not because they contribute, in
some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but be-
cause they form so central a part of an individual's life. "[T]he con-
cept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.'" And so we pro-
tect the decision whether to marry precisely because marriage "is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or so-
cial projects." We protect the decision whether to have a child be-
cause parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self-
definition, not because of demographic considerations or the Bible's
command to be fruitful and multiply. And we protect the family
because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals,
not because of a preference for stereotypical households. The Court
recognized... that the "ability independently to define one's iden-
tity that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exer-
cised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment
from close ties with others."36
Justice Blackmun views families and other forms of human association
as means serving the end of the personal development and continual self-
definition of the individual. Blackmun's individualism thus reduces the
family and other groups to mere collections of self-interested individuals.
Blackmun's individualism also views the entire history of the privacy right
as a part of the conflict between the individual and the state. Thus, to
Blackmun, privacy cases that rhetorically or technically appeared to protect
a certain form of association, such as marriage and the parent-child rela-
tionship, actually center on the freedom of the individual rather than on the
inherent value or worth of any particular form of association. The amoral
nature of this individualism is implicit in Blackmun's rejection of any "pref-
erence for stereotypical households."37
36. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alterations
in original) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 205 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (plurality
opinion)).
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Blackmun's next paragraph makes more explicit the amoralism of his
individualism, and the link of this amoralism to his implicit Sartrean
existentialism:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sex-
ual intimacy is "a sensitive, key-relationship of human existence,
central to family life, community welfare, and the development of
human personality." The fact that individuals define themselves in a
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be
many "right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an indi-
vidual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.38
Blackmun thus suggests that individuals possess a fundamental right to
engage in self-defining associational acts, at least so long as they are consen-
sual and involve adults. This proposed legal standard is clearly based on
the Sartrean existentialist view that "existence precedes essence," or more
directly, that we create ourselves through our choices. Blackmun's very use
of the term "self-defining act" apparently is a reflection of the Sartrean view
that we are not bound by nature or God to any fixed way of being, but
rather "create" ourselves through our choices.39 Therefore, "choice" for
both Sartre and Blackmun is a higher value than any traditional concept of
a fixed moral code;' the essence of choice is the ability to define, for one-
self, one's own morality.41 Thus, Blackmun appropriately places quotations
around the word "right" to indicate that the term is definable only
individualistically.
Blackmun italicizes "choice" as a way of emphasizing that associations
are primarily valuable because persons choose them, rather than because of
the inherent value or nature of the associations themselves. This subservi-
ence of human relationships to the value of making choices about those
relationships again echoes Sartre.4z
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. See, ag., SARTRE, supra note 33, at 15-19; JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHING-
NESS 34-45 (Hazel E. Barnes, 1956) [hereinafter SARTRE, NOTHINGNESS].
40. See, eg., SARTRE, supra note 33, at 51-57 (Man makes himself by his choices; freedom is
the basis of all values.).
41. IM. at 51. Sartre writes: "Man makes himself. He isn't ready made at the start. In choos-
ing his ethics, he makes himself, and force of circumstances is such that he can not abstain from
choosing one." Id
42. Id at 56-57. Sartre discusses the dilemma of whether a woman should satisfy her passion
or defer to the man's fiance by ultimately concluding that "[o]ne may choose anything if it is on
the grounds of free involvement." Id at 57.
1992]
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Blackmun's citation of Karst's article, The Freedom of Intimate Associa-
tion, is also revealing. 3 Karst argues that the freedom of intimate associa-
tion necessarily includes the right of disassociation.' The law, Karst
argues, must grant a legal right to unilateral divorce on demand-a disas-
sociational right-in order to truly protect marriage as a free association.45
Karst discusses "the paradox that making divorce fundamental, and thus
readily obtainable, might in the end make marriage seem much less so."'
Karst argues that the legal right to divorce actually enhances marriage be-
cause each day that the spouse stays "she chooses the commitment."'47
Therefore, Karst elevates choice as the ultimate value in relationships,
while necessarily redefining "commitment" to mean the act of doing, in the
moment, what one chooses. The entire traditional concept of commitment
as a binding future obligation completely disappears, apparently because
such a view of commitment would interfere with the full realization of the
value of individual self-definition. Karst's view of "commitment" is of
course consistent with Sartre's view that "freedom... is characterized by a
constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self...
The right of self-identification includes the right of self-development-
the right to not be bound by our prior choices. Our ethics, associations,
identity, and selves are not only individualistic but also necessarily revis-
able. Existence, Sartre claims, continually precedes essence; we create our-
selves not merely this moment, but every moment.49 The very act of choice
is the ultimate value, as everything we choose, whether relationships,
morals, acts, or identity, is itself valuable only so long as we continue to
choose it.5 °
Justice Blackmun's view of privacy is therefore premised on a certain
definition of the human person. Persons are those who make choices by
which they define, create, and develop themselves. Blackmun believes that
certain choices are particularly self-defining; choices, for example, about re-
lationships and ethics. Thus, persons are those who make choices regarding
relationships and ethics by which they define, create, and develop
themselves.
43. Karst, supra note 28, at 637.
44. Id. at 671-72 (Constitution requires no-fault divorce.).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 637 (quoting J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection
for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 577 (1977)).
47. Karst, supra note 28, at 638.
48. SARTRE, NOTHINGNESS, supra note 39, at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
49. SARTRE, supra note 33, at 28 (Man is condemned every moment to invent man.); SAR-
TRE, NOTHINGNESS, supra note 39, at 34-37.
50. See, e.g., SARTRE, NOTHINGNESS, supra note 39, at 38.
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2. Individual Autonomy and Abortion
The conceptual link between Justice Blackmun's opinions in Bowers v.
Hardwick and Roe v. Wade has not been sufficiently understood. Roe has
received scathing criticism,5" while Blackmun's Bowers dissent is generally
treated sympathetically. 2 Much of the criticism of the Roe opinion reflects
the desire to justify the abortion right in a more compelling and reasoned
way."3 The primary defect of Roe is seen as its lack of explanation for the
result reached.54 Analysis of Roe and its progeny demonstrates that the
concept of the person presented in Blackmun's Bowers dissent is helpful in
explaining Roe.
The major dilemma facing those desiring to rewrite Roe is explaining
why a woman's desire to abort outweighs the fetus's right to life. Justice
Blackmun's Roe opinion asserted that the Court "need not resolve the diffi-
cult question of when life begins.""5 Blackmun's claim of agnosticism con-
cerning the nature of the fetus has never been particularly compelling to the
scholarly community. Indeed, as the years have passed, academic support-
51. A complete review of the literature is impossible here as Roe has been the subject of over
200 law review articles. See Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. Wade, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231,
237 n.39 (1985). Many of the more prominent critics of Roe have come from outside of the pro-
life community. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (1975).
The editors of the MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW surveyed the literature on Roe and concluded:
"[The consensus among legal academics seems to be that, whatever one thinks of the holding, the
opinion is unsatisfying."; Editors Preface, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1568, 1568 (1979); ARCHIBALD COX,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976); John H. Ely,
The Wages of Crying Worlf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A.
Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv.
159.
52. For example, one commentator labeled the opinion as "the seminal statement on the right
to privacy" and praised it as "consummately humanistic" and showing "deep understanding and
sensitivity." Larry Gostin, Guest Editor's Introduction, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 153, 157-58 (1987).
53. See, e.g., Douglas E. Barzelay & Phillip B. Heymann, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rev. 765 (1973) Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 269 (1975). Professor Tribe alone has adopted several different theories for sup-
porting the result in Roe. See Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) (Roe necessary because abortion issue is
intrinsically religious.); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
269 (1975) (Roe necessary to aid evolution of new societal consensus.); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928-29 (1978) (repudiating view that Roe is necessary be-
cause abortion issue is inherently religious); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1337-59 (2d ed. 1988) (Roe necessary for women's equality, and supported by proscription
against involuntary servitude) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
54. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: Justifying Roe v.
Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 189, 200-01 (1987) (noting Court's failure to explain its choice of
viability standard).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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ers of the abortion right have moved away from ridiculing or ignoring fetal
characteristics and rights to addressing why the life of the fetus must give
way to the desires of the woman. 6
On its face, the principle of individual autonomy does not explain the
result in Roe. The obvious question remains: What about the autonomy of
the fetus? The result in Roe, however, is consistent with the view of the
person articulated in Blackmun's Bowers dissent. This consistency is
made apparent by more recent efforts to rewrite Roe.
Recent justifications of Roe have focused on two different kinds of fetal
characteristics. Professor Tribe is illustrative of commentators who focus
on nonviability as the fetal characteristic that justifies Roe.58 Professor
Tribe notes that the previable fetus, even if viewed as a "genuine baby" or a
full human being, is uniquely dependent on her mother.5 9 This dependence
is unique because it is nontransferable-no one else can bear the mother's
burden and successfully sustain the fetus. Professor Tribe argues that our
society generally does not require particular individuals to use their bodies
to sustain another's life, even if they are related to that individual.'
Professor Tribe's analysis is consistent with the views of associations
and of persons articulated in Justice Blackmun's Bowers dissent.6 Both
Tribe and Blackmun focus on the individual when discussing associations;
both perceive the element of individual choice as the preeminent value in
associations. According to Justice Blackmun, associations are rich and
meaningful precisely because we can choose their nature and form.62 Im-
plicit in this statement is a recognition of the individual's right to sever, or
refuse, associations. Justice Blackmun does not protect associations per se;
instead, he protects the rights of individuals to make individual choices con-
cerning associations. 63 Given this view of associations, it is entirely consis-
tent to state that an individual woman has a right not to associate with her
unborn child, even if the child is fully human and uniquely dependent upon
56. Legal commentators illustrating this trend include Catherine MacKinnon and Laurence
Tribe. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 94 (1987); TRIBE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 1352-59; The seminal article defending legal abortion even if the
unborn are human persons predates Roe. See Judith Jarvis Thompson, "A Defense ofAbortion," I
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
57. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53.
59. Id. at 1356.
60. See id. at 1354-58; see also LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 17
(1985) (conceding that fetus can plausibly be described as a "genuine baby").
61. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
62. Id. at 205.
63. See generally id.
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her. The result may be, as Tribe acknowledges, tragic," but it follows from
the very nature of human persons, as viewed through the lens of the broad
privacy right.
In addition, the unique dependence of the previable fetus suggests that
the fetus is not a person, or not fully a person, under Blackmun's per-
sonhood definition.65 Persons, according to Blackmun, are those able to
make choices regarding associations.66 By definition, a previable fetus can-
not make choices regarding associations because the fetus cannot live with-
out being physically within the mother's body. The previable fetus's
dependency upon her mother is so profound, so physical, and so essential to
continued life, that it is fair to view the previable fetus as lacking the situa-
tional capacity to make choices regarding associations. Thus, the utter
helplessness and dependency of the previable fetus upon her mother leads to
the conclusion that the woman-fetus relationship is not necessarily a true
association. Rather, the mother-fetus dyad will only have value, and be a
true association, if the mother, a true or full person, chooses to treat it as
such.
Total reliance on viability is unsatisfactory to some. First, the view that
persons have the right to make choices to end associations does not explain
why that right outweighs a right to survive and be brought to birth in a
viable condition. Second, the view is unsatisfactory because it eliminates
fetal rights by virtue of characteristics that are purely relational. Viability
is not a characteristic of the fetus, but instead is a characteristic of the rela-
tionship between the fetus, the pregnant woman, and developing medical
technology. A fetus that was previable in 1960 might be viable in 1990. It
is unsettling to determine the moral rights of the fetus in terms that change
with medical technology and have no inherent relation to the actual charac-
teristics of the fetus.
These gaps in the viability standard are apparently filled by reference to
inherent characteristics of the fetus. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists67 illus-
trates a combination of the viability approach with the fetal characteristics
approach:
Justice White is also surely wrong in suggesting that the govern-
mental interest in protecting fetal life is equally compelling during
the entire period from the moment of conception until the moment
64. TRIBE, CONSrrrTiONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 1358.
65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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of birth.... I should think it obvious that the State's interest in the
protection of an embryo--even if that interest is defined as "protect-
ing those who will be citizens,"-increases progressively and dra-
matically as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience
pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by
day. 68
Roe mentions only one of the four criteria named by Justice Stevens-
the ability to survive, or viability-in its evaluation of state interests in fetal
life.69 The state's interest in potential or fetal life was said to grow "in
substantiality as the woman approaches term, ' '70 but growth of this state
interest could not justify any restrictions on, or regulation of, the abortion
right until it became "compelling. ' ' 71 Viability was the sole determinant of
when the state's interest became compelling, and thus became the sole rele-
vant consideration in determining fetal rights. Justice Stevens's defense of
Roe therefore seems to contradict it by relying on three fetal characteristics
that are apparently irrelevant under Roe and its progeny.
A number of commentators have attempted to rewrite Roe by sug-
gesting that the time at which viability occurs is a fair dividing point be-
cause prior to that time the fetus is not sufficiently developed to consider it
a "person." These commentators make reference to inherent fetal charac-
teristics, principally brain and nervous system development and consequent
abilities, as the ultimate criterion of fetal rights.72 The fetal capacities noted
by Justice Stevens--capacities to feel pleasure and pain, and to react to sur-
roundings-are results of brain and nervous system development and are
consistent with this approach.
These fetal development criteria are also consistent with the view of the
human person reflected in Justice Blackmun's Bowers dissent.73 The requi-
site level of development is defined in terms of human consciousness and
volitional activity: to feel pleasure and pain, to react to the environment,
68. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
70. Id. at 162-63.
71. Id.
72. See Ronald E. Cranford, M.D. & David R. Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical
Moral (Constitutional) Standard for Human Personhood, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 239 (1987);
Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639
(1986); Robertson, supra note 54, at 198-202; Ken Martyn, Note, TechnologicalAdvances and Roe
v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1194 (1982). This viewpoint
therefore suggests that viability in itself would be an inadequate standard because "viability does
not mark a particular biological change in the fetus. The viable fetus has no more capability for
self-awareness or feeling pain than a pre-viable fetus." Rhoden, supra, at 663.
73. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and to choose to act rather than just to act. As persons are viewed primar-
ily as those with a free will-those who experience and choose-then per-
sonhood requires a certain minimal level of brain development.74
The facts in this area are quite controversial. It is difficult to know pre-
cisely when a fetus can feel pleasure or pain because physiological reactions
to stimuli can arguably occur automatically without any consciousness or
inner experience. The fetus clearly reacts to her environment long before
viability; it is difficult to know, however, whether those reactions represent
automatic physiological function or conscious experience accompanied by
volitional choice. In speaking of fetal experience, consciousness, and
choice, we enter a twilight zone of seemingly unprovable assertions.75
The definition of personhood in terms of volition and consciousness sug-
gests that the previable fetus does not make choices and have experiences in
the same way as a teenager or adult. The fetus, therefore, is either not a
person or is less of a person than the woman carrying the fetus. If the ulti-
mate goal is the free development of personality, and personality develop-
ment implies the capacity and freedom to make conscious choices, then
given a choice between a person fully capable of choices and a partial per-
son not so equipped, one favors the fully developed person. Personhood
gives rights that can be limited only by the rights of other persons. The
maximization of personality requires that those capable of choices not be
inhibited by the supposed needs of those living forms who are not as yet
truly capable of choice.
One objection to the fetal characteristics approach to abortion has been
that it would lead to infanticide. For example, it has been stated, that the
74. Michael Tooley is one example of those who explicitly make a separation between being a
biological member of the species, and being a "person," and whose "personhood" criteria is linked
to brain and nervous system development and certain consequent abilities. See generally
MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983). Mr. Tooley's argument is somewhat
distinctive in that he relies on "the property of being an enduring subject of non-momentary
interests," rather than capacities for rational thought, free action, or self-consciousness, as his
primary definition of personhood." Id at 303. Tooley, however, does consider definitions of per-
sonhood relying on these capacities to be competing plausible approaches. See id at 359. More-
over, Tooley's definition of personhood includes within it various capacities, such as the capacity
to have thoughts about times other than the present, which constitute specific conscious thought
processes. Id
75. Other writers have noted the parallel problem of determining the correlation between
"thought processes and the brain's physical and electrical development .. " Nancy K. Rhoden,
The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEo. L.J. 1451, 1493 n.332
(1984) [hereinafter Live Birth Dilemma] (quoting Martyn, supra note 72, at 1209); see also
Rhoden, supra note 72, at 663 nn.133-34. On the question of fetal pain, see K.J.S. Anand et a].,
Pain and Its Effects In the Human Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1321 (1987). The
ability of the fetus to respond to stimuli, regardless of whether it experiences pain, appears to be
established.
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neonate is also not a "person" in the full sense of the term.76 The previable
fetus during much of her development resembles a neonate more closely
than a neonate resembles an adult.77 The combination of the fetal charac-
teristics approach and the viability approach is capable of answering this
objection. Society as a whole is obligated to human nonpersons because
they have the potential to attain personhood. 71 Previable fetuses are dis-
tinct from neonates because only one other person in the world can sustain
their claim to develop into persons. Once a fetus becomes viable, her right
to develop does not directly conflict with the right of any other person to
control their body.79 It is the combination of lack of development and de-
pendence which requires that a previable fetus be subject to abortion if her
mother chooses that alternative.8"
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services81
is particularly significant because he, as the author of Roe, quoted and em-
braced the argument previously made by Justice Stevens that the viability
standard is supported by inherent fetal characteristics.8 2 Justice Blackmun
apparently found the combined dependency/inherent characteristics test of
76. See, e.g., TOOLEY, supra note 74, at 407. Tooley appears to accept the inference that
infanticide, like abortion, should be permitted. See id. at 413-16.
77. Thus, Michael Tooley's review of the scientific evidence relating to behavioral capacities
and neurophysiological development leads him to conclude that the human neonate, and thus
presumably the fetus, lack the capacities necessary to most current definitions of personhood. See
TOOLEY, supra note 74, at 357-407. Thus, the fetus and neonate are both nonpersons, while older
children and adults are persons.
78. It has been debated whether potential persons, those with the capacity to develop into
persons, should be protected by virtue of their potentiality. See, e.g., id. at 165-285.
79. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 1357-58. Tribe supports the viabil-
ity line even if previable fetuses are regarded as "full human beings" rather than human nonper-
sons or potential life. Id. at 1354. His views on the distinction between society's obligation to the
fetus, and the woman's obligation, therefore do not depend on labeling the fetus as a "potential"
person.
80. The distinction between a woman's right to removal of a fetus, and her right to the death
of a fetus have been discussed. Even given a pro-choice premise, it can be held that a woman does
not have a right to a dead fetus or dead baby. The issue has presented practical applications
because some abortions have produced live births and because attempts have been made to limit
the choice of abortion technique in the interest of fetal survival.
81. 492 U.S. 490, 537-60 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun quoted the portion of Justice
Stevens's Thornburgh concurrence, which enunciates the combined dependency/fetal characteris-
tics approach to fetal rights, and commented that "I cannot improve upon what Justice Stevens
has written." Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Blackmun's Webster dissent. Justice Blackmun's language was apparently taken from an abortion
rights amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of a large group of law professors. See Webster
Brief, supra note 25, at 4 ("State cannot define a compelling interest in the fetus that is distinct
from, and paramount to, the rights or interests of the pregnant woman").
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fetal rights so compelling that he virtually jettisoned his prior agnosticism
in favor of absolutist language:
The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal de-
velopment; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus
cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and
objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct
from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman."3
Thus, while Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe had considered the ques-
tion of when life begins so unresolvable as to mandate state skepticism, 4 his
Webster dissent reveals a man so certain that the previable fetus lacks rights
that he is willing to label the pro-life position as objectively unreasonable.8 5
David Hume could have told Blackmun that a gap exists between his
enunciation of certain facts about fetal development and his evaluative con-
clusion regarding fetal rights.86 The missing link between the biological
facts and Blackmun's conclusion is found in Blackmun's Sartrean auton-
omy premises, as stated in Bowers.87 Moreover, even autonomy theory is
less determinate than Blackmun's absolutism suggests.
First, the fit of the theory to the law is not exact. Although Tribe, Ste-
vens, and Blackmun defend the viability standard, the Court's broad defini-
83. Webster, 492 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's statement that
the fetus cannot be viewed as having rights "paramount to" the pregnant woman is an odd way of
stating that the previable fetus's right to life can never outweigh the woman's right to choose an
abortion. Obviously, some would argue that abortion prohibitions equalize the rights of woman
and fetus, rather than making the fetus's rights "paramount." This is the view, for example, of the
Eighth Amendment of the Irish Constitution, which asserts "the right to life of the unborn" and
"the equal right to life of the mother." I.R. CONST. amend. VIII.
84. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
85. See generally Webster, 492 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 520-21 (Penquin E. Mossner ed.,
1969) (Moral conclusions cannot be deduced from facts.). The fact-value distinction disappears in
the light of a teleological universe. See, eg., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 57-59, 83-
84 (2d ed. 1984); CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE DEFENSE OF THE FAITH 96-150 (3d ed. 1967).
Justice Blackmun's judicial relativism, however, necessarily presupposes that constitutional rea-
soning must assume the lack of such a universe. Therefore, it is highly ironic that Justice Black-
mun would confound facts and values in such absolutist terms.
87. See, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1986). It could be stated that Blackmun
possesses, in a paradoxical sense, an existentialist "teleology of freedom" that makes sense of his
jump from the facts of fetal development to the conclusion concerning fetal rights. The difficulty,
of course, is those who differ with Blackmun's philosophy, or view of the teleology or function or
purpose of life, are apt to draw very different evaluative inferences from the facts of fetal develop-
ment. Unless Blackmun is willing to label all nonexistentialists as irrational, he cannot condemn
fetal rights as objectively irrational. Indeed, it is hard to know what definition of "rationality"




tion of "health" under Doe v. Bolton,"5 Roe's companion case, has made it
very difficult to prohibit even third-trimester abortions.8 9 The Court, more-
over, clearly withheld constitutional personhood from the fetus until
birth.90
Second, the fit between autonomy theory and Roe is one of plausibility
or reasonableness, not one of necessity. Autonomy theory can reasonably
lead to a wide variety of conclusions regarding the developmentally imma-
ture. Although the autonomy theory plausibly leads to a viability or birth
standard, it also plausibly leads to the allowance of infanticide, based on the
lack of brain development of the neonate and the parental and societal in-
terest in avoiding the burden of unwanted or defective offspring.91 By con-
trast, autonomy theorists can, with logic and consistency, embrace strict
prohibitions against abortion. Some who value individual autonomy will
believe that the fetus's interest in life outweighs the woman's interest in
aborting; the fetus's greater interest, that of physical survival, can be seen as
compensating for her lesser degree of development. The fact that even med-
ical textbooks and abortion rights advocates describe the fetus, well before
viability, as looking and even functioning like a human baby,92 may move
some to demand that society protect the fetus, regardless of the lack of
cognitive development.
The looseness of the link between Roe and autonomy theory is illus-
trated by the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.93 Justices Ken-
88. 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
89. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769
(1986) (cannot require any trade-off between maternal health and survival of a viable fetus);
Schulte v. Douglas, 567 F. Supp. 522 (D. Neb. 1981), affid sub nom., Womens Servs. v. Douglas,
710 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (invalidating statute prohibiting postviability abortion
except where the procedure was "necessary to preserve the woman from imminent peril that sub-
stantially endangers her life or health"); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 196-97 (E.D.
La. 1980) (invalidating Louisiana law permitting postviability abortions to prevent "permanent
impairment" to woman's health), affid, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A
PRIVATE CHOICE 12 (1979) (Roe and Doe permit postviability abortion where pregnant woman
can find "an abortionist who believed she needed an abortion"). But see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (reemphasizing viability standard).
90. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
91. See generally TOOLEY, supra note 74, at 413-16.
92. Laurence Tribe, noting that the fetus possesses brain waves and human features, stated
that the fetus can plausibly be described as a "genuine baby." TRIBE, supra note 60, at 17. A
medical school text states that by the end of the eighth week "the main organ systems have been
established ... and the major features of the external body form are recognizable .... T.W.
SADLER, LANGMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 58 (5th ed. 1985). The text further comments, in
words accompanying a photograph of a 12 week fetus in utero, that "[t]he face has all the human
characteristics .... " Id. at 83.
93. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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nedy, O'Connor, and Souter warmly embraced autonomy and the
recognition of a woman's liberty interest in choosing abortion.94 They re-
fused, however, to affirm the correctness of Roe's balancing of the woman's
autonomy and fetal survival. The plurality relied on stare decisis in uphold-
ing Roe's viability standard, while hinting that one or more of them would
have upheld significant previability prohibitions of abortion had the ques-
tion not already been determined in Roe.95 The joint opinion's reliance on
stare decisis rather than "reasoned judgment" 96 or "principled justifica-
tion," 97 underscores the arbitrariness of Roe's viability standard and balanc-
ing of maternal and fetal rights, even within an autonomy framework.
The looseness of the argument linking the autonomy theory to Roe leads
to the question of why so many autonomy theorists have embraced and
defended Roe. Michael McConnell has commented that finding a rationale
for Roe has seemed to be "the holy grail of modem constitutional theo-
rizing.")98 Clearly, many have been committed to Roe before finding any
adequate justification, at least as a matter of constitutional law. What as-
pect of the autonomy theory has led to this reflexive, pre-analytic embrace
of Roe? The answer takes us to an analysis of the relationship between
autonomy and equality.
3. Autonomy, Abortion, and Equality
The Due Process Clause and its protection of "liberty" has become the
textual source of unenumerated rights.99 For autonomy theorists, "liberty"
has come to mean "individual autonomy." Most autonomy theorists have
come to believe that autonomy demands abortion rights. Indeed, some
have gone so far as to argue that laws restricting abortion would strip wo-
men of their personhood. 1° The Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses are often viewed as "open-ended" provisions that implicitly grant
the Supreme Court substantial authority to review state statutes.101 The
94. See Casey, 505 U.S. at-, -, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08, 2810-11.
95. See iL at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
96. Id at , 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (Adjudication of substantive due process claims necessarily
involves "reasoned judgment.").
97. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 ("[A] decision without principled justification would be no
judicial act at all.").
98. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convic-
tions Into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1539 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
PoLITcs, AND LAW (1988)).
99. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
100. See, eg., ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 346 (rev. ed.
1990); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION 128 (1990) (granting fetal personhood "makes the wo-
man less than a full person").
101. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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Court's discretion under modem substantive due process analysis largely
consists of determining which unenumerated liberty interests should be
deemed "fundamental rights." The Court's discretion under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is exercised in determining which legislative classifications
merit heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court has sometimes exercised a
due process-like review in equal protection cases by applying strict scrutiny
based on the fundamental nature of the right infringed, rather than based
upon the suspect nature of the legislative classification. Thus, the Court in
Skinner v. Oklahoma10 2 purported to invalidate a sterilization law based on
an irrational legislative classification; at the same time, the Court claimed to
apply strict scrutiny because the law "involves one of the basic civil rights
of man." 
10 3
Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,1" a four Justice majority invalidated
an anticontraceptive measure purportedly based on the irrationality of the
legislative classifications, while claiming to avoid the decision of whether
the liberty interest of an individual in using contraception was a fundamen-
tal right. 105 The rational basis equal protection analysis employed in Eisen-
stadt was functionally similar to strict scrutiny because the four Justice
majority placed an unusually high burden on the State to demonstrate the
means-end fit. Generally, the Eisenstadt Court appeared to substitute its
own view of "rationality" for that of the legislature, thus echoing the ten-
dency of the Lochner1 °6 era substantive due process cases to employ an ex-
tremely strict "rationality" level of review.107
The Court has thus evidenced a marked tendency to use the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to perform, in a sometimes hidden way, the substantive due
process function of protecting unenumerated fundamental rights. Equality,
in other words, has been used to serve the cause of protecting liberty. Au-
tonomy theorists, who believe that "liberty" means "autonomy," have thus
wished to use "equality" as a means of protecting "autonomy."
102. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
103. Id. at 541.
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Id. at 446-55. The four Justice opinion is a "majority" because two Justices, Rehnquist
and Powell, did not participate in the decision. Id. at 455. Justice White concurred in the result,
and did not reach the issue of whether a distinction in contraception legislation between the mar-
ried and unmarried is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 460-65 (White, J., concurring).
106. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
107. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 761 (4th ed. 1991) (Eisenstadt
majority claimed to employ the traditional equal protection standard of review but nonetheless
"clearly employed some form of independent judicial scrutiny."). Thus, Chief Justice Burger's
dissent complained that the four Justice majority and Justice White's concurrence "seriously in-
vade the constitutional prerogatives of the States and regrettably hark back to the heyday of
substantive due process." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 467.
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Generally, however, the grand theme of equality for the Court has been
the protection of racial equality. The Court's great act in interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause has been its determination that "separate but
equal" is not equal, regardless of what the framers and ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment may have intended. 10 The continuing struggle to inter-
pret, apply, and enforce the principle of racial equality has apparently made
the Court less inclined to use the Equal Protection Clause as an open-ended
invitation to social engineering in other areas. The Court has declared few
classifications, outside those of race, as suspect. 109 Its extensive case law in
the area of race, with its complicating issues of affirmative action 110 and the
proper scope of remedying de jure segregation, 111 has led to some rules that
actually limit the scope of review under the Equal Protection Clause. Liti-
gants, for example, must prove that a law is intentionally discriminatory;
the mere existence of discriminatory effect is insufficient. 112 The Court's
protection of racial equality has consumed and limited its protection of
equality in almost the same way that its protection of abortion has con-
sumed and limited its protection of privacy.1 13
108. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court purported to invalidate
separate but equal only in the realm of public education. The Court's subsequent invalidations of
other applications of separate but equal on the authority of Brown are usually accepted as sug-
gesting that Brown is the basis for a general abandonment of separate but equal.
109. Racial minorities and national origin currently enjoy the status of being suspect classes.
See NOWAK, supra note 107, at 576. The Court has described alienage as a suspect class, but the
review is apparently not as strict as for racial minorities and national origin, and different stan-
dards of review are applied dependent on the characteristics of the law. rd. at 576, 702-16. Classi-
fications based on gender and illegitimacy are also subject to heightened review, sometimes
referred to as intermediary scrutiny. See, eg., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
110. See generally Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 493 U.S. 33 (1990); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Wash-
ington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443
U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley (II),
433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974), aft'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215
(1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
112. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
113. This is not meant as a criticism of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. The ap-
plication of the equality principle to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment was motivated
primarily by the need of the national government to protect the former slaves; it therefore makes
sense to make racial equality the preeminent concern in defining the doctrine of equality. The
Court's substantial investment of its limited legitimacy in the creation and enforcement of a broad
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The doctrinal limitations of the Equal Protection Clause have frustrated
those who wish to use it to support broad abortion rights. First, the Court
has refused to consider abortion restrictions as evidence of discriminatory
intent or as violative of equal protection. '14 Even if abortion restrictions
have the effect of disadvantaging women, such an effect would be insuffi-
cient to constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 1 5 Second,
the Court has held that gender discrimination demands only intermediate
scrutiny, under which it upholds discriminatory statutes that are substan-
tially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.' 16
In Roe, the Court held that the state has an "important and legitimate in-
terest" in protecting fetal life which grows "in substantiality" throughout
pregnancy."' Thus a statute, such as an abortion prohibition, which sub-
stantially served the state's "important" interest in fetal life should be up-
held under intermediate scrutiny, even if the Court found such statute to be
discriminatory in intent.
Despite these doctrinal barriers, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Casey
proposed an explicit grounding for the abortion right in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."' Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services" 9 had rhetorically embraced the argument that abortion
rights are necessary to women's equality, while refraining from a textual or
doctrinal reliance on the Equal Protection Clause:
Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a
landmark case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the
hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to
believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise
some control over her unique ability to bear children. The plurality
does so either oblivious or insensitive to the fact that millions of
women, and their families, have ordered their lives around the right
to reproductive choice, and that this right has become vital to the
abortion right, however, cannot be similarly justified. Abortion rights represent a distortion,
rather than a validation, of the constitutional principles represented by the right of privacy.
114. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23, 323 n.26 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 469-71 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976).
115. See, e.g., Washington, 426 U.S. 229.
116. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973), afi'd in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The joint opinion in Casey stated that
"Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman's liberty but also the State's
'important and legitimate interest in potential life.' " Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -,
-, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992).
118. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
119. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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full participation of women in the economic and political walks of
American life.
120
The joint opinion in Casey, in discussing reliance on Roe, echoed Justice
Blackmun's Webster dissent:
[f]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and so-
cial life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives.21
The joint opinion further relied on gender equality themes in its affirma-
tion of the abortion right as a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty"1 22 and in
its invalidation of Pennsylvania's spousal notification law.1 23 The joint
opinion failed to specifically cite the Equal Protection Clause, but broadly
spoke of a constitutional understanding of marriage, the family, and the
individual.124 It was clear that gender equality concerns and an emphasis
on individual autonomy were prominent elements of their constitutional vi-
sion of the family.
1 2 1
Justice Blackmun, the authors of the joint opinion, and a number of
academics are essentially asserting that women need legal access to elective
abortion in order to be equal to men. This view is so strongly held that it is
considered virtually axiomatic. Thus, Professor Tribe has declared that
"[l]aws restricting abortion so dramatically shape the lives of women, and
only of women, that their denial of equality hardly needs detailed elabora-
tion. While men retain the right to sexual and reproductive autonomy, re-
strictions on abortion deny that autonomy to women." 126 Autonomy
theorists, in other words, believe that women need broad abortion rights in
order to be equally autonomous.
To autonomy theorists, a denial of equal autonomy is a serious matter,
given that individual autonomy is held as the highest value, and the very
criterion of human personhood. The premise that abortion rights are neces-
sary to equal autonomy explains why most autonomy theorists balance the
conflict between the fetus and the woman as they do, despite the plausibility
120. Id. at 557 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
123. See id at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2830-31.
124. Id.
125. See id
126. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 105.
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of views that severely restrict abortion rights in the interest of fetal auton-
omy and survival. The elaborate defense of Roe in terms of inherent and
relational fetal characteristics is not adopted because it is compelling;
rather, it is adopted as the most plausible means of resolving the fetal/fe-
male conflict in a manner that will create gender equality.
One root of Roe, then, is the premise that women need abortion rights
to be equally autonomous to men. As a preliminary matter, one could dis-
pute that individual autonomy is the principal meaning of liberty. Putting
this question temporarily aside, one can seriously question the axiom that
abortion rights are necessary to equal autonomy. Like many abstract pro-
positions, this one can be usefully analyzed in the context of a specific dis-
pute: In this case the one posed by federal intervention to assure access to
abortion facilities.
4. Equal Autonomy, the Klan Act, and Operation Rescue
It is entirely fitting that Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,127
one of the two primary abortion-related cases before the Court in the Octo-
ber 1991 Term, directly posed the question of whether "opposition to abor-
tion [is] per se discrimination against women for purposes of the 'class
animus' requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)? " 128 Bray was argued shortly
before the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas, and the eight member
Court was apparently unable to resolve the case.1 29 Therefore, Bray was
reargued early in the October 1992 Term and finally decided in January
1993. The dispute whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871131 gives federal
courts jurisdiction to intervene against Operation Rescue "conspiracies"
achieved national prominence with Judge Patrick Kelly's assertion of that
jurisdiction in Wichita, Kansas.13 1 The Supreme Court had already ac-
cepted Bray when the Wichita controversy brought the role of federal
judges in these cases into public scrutiny.
It is a common misunderstanding to view Judge Kelly, or other simi-
larly situated judges, as using the Klan Act as a means of enforcing the
abortion right against the actions of Operation Rescue. It is true that under
the Klan Act judges are given jurisdiction to enjoin certain infringements of
127. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
128. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753.
129. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758. The order did not give a reason for restoring the case to the
calendar for reargument, but the most obvious rationale would be that the eight person court was
deadlocked.
130. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (current version 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
131. See, e.g., Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue, No. 91-1303-K, Aug. 27,
1991 (Memorandum Opinion of District Judge Patrick Kelly).
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constitutional rights. However, Supreme Court precedent, and most lower
court decisions, appear to agree that Fourteenth Amendment rights, such
as the abortion right, can only be asserted against state actors. Thus, the
Klan Act generally cannot be used as a basis for protecting the abortion
right from the activities of Operation Rescue, an association of private indi-
viduals. 132 The actual right supposedly protected by Judge Kelly and other
federal judges has technically been the right of interstate travel, based on
the allegation that some women travel interstate to receive abortion services
at the target clinic. 133 Operation Rescue defendants and the Justice Depart-
ment made the obvious argument that the right to travel cannot be
stretched this far, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed."'
Operation Rescue defendants also raised an issue under the Klan Act
that ideologically and rhetorically attacks the core of the abortion rights
position. The second of five questions that the Operation Rescue petitioners
posed in Bray was whether "opposition to abortion [is] per se discrimina-
tion against women for purposes of the 'class animus' requirement of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3)?"'13' The intensely ideological issue of whether opposition
to abortion is antifemale arises out of the Supreme Court's holding that
Section 1985(3) claims require proof of a conspiracy "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws."136 This requires that the conspiracy be "motivated by a specific
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." '1 37
The extensive district court findings in Bray stated that the defendants
believe that abortion is child-killing and conspired in order to save the lives
of fetuses and reverse the legalization of abortion.1 38 The named Operation
132. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983);
Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991); Mississippi
Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989); NOW v. Operation Rescue,
726 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1989); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989),
afld in part, rev'd in part, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v.
Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983). Contra Lewis v. Pearson Found.,
Inc., 908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 764.
133. Women's Health Care Servs., supra note 132; Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
134. See generally Brief of Petitioners, Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753.
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at (i), Bray, 113 S. Ct. 753.
136. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988)).
137. See NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1492 (quoting Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th
Cir. 1985)); see also United Bhd. of Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 834-35 (requirement of class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus critical to ensure that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) does not become a
general federal tort law).
138. See NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1487-90.
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Rescue petitioner in Bray was a woman. The Supreme Court therefore was
asked whether a woman who conspires to block abortion facilities out of a
sincere desire to stop what she views as "child-killing" is actually moti-
vated, as a matter of law, by an invidious intent to subjugate or discriminate
against women. In Klan Act analysis, as in Equal Protection analysis, the
law's requirement of discriminatory intent makes it very difficult for auton-
omy theorists to prove inequality. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Bray
forthrightly rejected the equation of anti-abortion motivation with an-
tifemale animus:
Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be denied that there
are common and respectable reasons for opposing it, other than ha-
tred of or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concern-
ing) women as a class-as is evident from the fact that men and
women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful demonstrations. 139
Justice Scalia further rejected the implicit comparison of anti-abortion
activists with racists:
The nature of the "invidiously discriminatory animus" Griffin
had in mind is suggested both by the language used in that phrase
("invidious... [tiending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to
give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating," Web-
ster's Second International Dictionary 1306 (1954)) and by the com-
pany in which the phrase is found ("there must be some racial or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus,"
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added)). Whether one agrees or
disagrees with the goal of preventing abortion, that goal in itself
(apart from the use of unlawful means to achieve it, which is not
relevant to our discussion of animus) does not remotely qualify for
such harsh description, and for such derogatory association with ra-
cism. To the contrary, we have said that "a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion" is proper and reasonable enough to be im-
plemented by the allocation of public funds, see Maher, supra, 432
U.S. at 474, and Congress itself has, with our approval, discrimi-
nated against abortion in its provision of financial support for medi-
cal procedures, see Harris, supra, 448 U.S. at 325. This is not the
stuff out of which a § 1985(3) "invidiously discriminatory animus"
is created."40
Justice Scalia's reminder that a moral and even legislative disfavoring of
abortion is still "common," "respectable, .... proper," and "reasonable,"
while a similar disfavoring based upon race is not, profoundly undermines
139. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
140. Id. at 761-62.
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the abortion rights position. That position, as we shall see,14 rhetorically
and logically requires that Brown v. Board of Education42 be generally ac-
knowledged as analogous to Roe. If Operation Rescue activists are not
Klansmen, but instead act from respectable motivations, then legal efforts
to crush them cannot fairly be compared to Reconstruction era efforts to
protect the rights of the freed slaves, or to post-Brown efforts to integrate
the public schools. Indeed, the historical analogies from a pro-life perspec-
tive are reversed, with anti-abortion activists comparing themselves to the
abolitionists and civil rights activists of these prior eras.
Justice Scalia's analysis to some degree avoids the issue of abortion and
gender by refusing to automatically associate an anti-abortion attitude with
any particular view of women. Justice Scalia is correct that persons with a
variety of views of what facilitates gender equality oppose elective abortion,
and thus is correct that the issues of abortion and gender equality should, as
a matter of legal animus, be separated. On the other hand, from a rhetori-
cal and political perspective it is important to note that pro-life activists
generally link abortion to the issue of gender equality, but do so in a way
precisely opposite to that articulated by abortion rights activists.
It will be surprising to some to realize that pro-life citizens, both female
and male, typically perceive the view that women need abortion rights to be
equal to men as profoundly antifemale and sexist. The following Section,
adapted from the author's amicus curiae brief in Bray, 43 therefore attempts
to articulate the commonly held pro-life view that it is the abortion rights
position, rather than the anti-abortion position, that is antifemale.
5. The Antifemale Nature of Abortion Rights Arguments
The mere fact that women can become pregnant, and men cannot, does
not in itself demonstrate that women need abortion in order to be equally
autonomous to men. Initially, one might note that this capacity can be both
a benefit and a burden. Although it is true that a man will never experience
the burdens of being pregnant, it is equally true that a man will never expe-
rience the benefits of being pregnant. Men will never experience the joy,
satisfaction, and bonding that carrying and birthing a child can produce.
Difference does not in itself produce a conclusion regarding equality; the
judgment of equality is rather a value determination.
141. See infra notes 255-315 and accompanying text.
142. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief of the Southern Center for Law and Ethics, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, No. 90-985 (filed Apr. 9, 1991). This author was the author
of the argument section of the brief; the counsel of record, Albert L. Jordan, along with others,
edited the brief and participated in the writing of other sections of the brief.
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Those who view abortion rights as necessary to gender equality are ap-
parently unimpressed by the possibility that pregnancy and birth can offer
unique benefits to women. For example, Professor Regan spends three
pages describing the physical burdens of pregnancy. 144 He then acknowl-
edges briefly that a wanted pregnancy may nonetheless be "worthwhile, or
... a transcendent experience .... "145 Regan denies the same possibility to
an unwanted pregnancy. 146 Regan is obviously wrong in his assumption
that a pregnancy that is unwanted, at a specific point in time, can never be
experienced as ultimately worthwhile and even "transcendent." Indeed, the
literature indicates that the majority of women who are denied an abortion
eventually shift to a positive attitude toward their child that obliterates any
differences between their attitudes and those of women with wanted
pregnancies. 147
Moreover, Regan's focus on the physical burdens of pregnancy and
birth misses the reality that most women who seek abortions apparently do
so to avoid the result-a born infant at a certain time of their life-rather
than to avoid the physical process of pregnancy and childbirth.' 48 Yet, it is
precisely this dissatisfaction with the result, the born infant, that is most apt
to disappear if the abortion is denied. 49 Regan also appears to miss en-
tirely the point that some women physically enjoy certain aspects of preg-
nancy, and even of birth. These miscalculations underscore Regan's
complete failure to compare the burdens of pregnancy and birth to the
male's loss at lacking any similar capacity. A man can never choose to be-
come pregnant and give birth; a prohibition of abortion still leaves the fe-
male far ahead of the male in regard to choices concerning pregnancy and
childbirth.
If you evaluate male sexuality from the perspective of female sexuality,
it is entirely possible to conclude that the absolutely immutable male inabil-
ity to conceive, bear, and birth new life renders him hopelessly inferior in
both his reproductive capacity and his reproductive choices. The male
function in the process of reproduction appears insignificant and replacea-
144. Regan, supra note 53, at 1579-82.
145. Id. at 1582.
146. Id. For example, Professor Regan states that "the question is not whether pregnancy is
worthwhile, or whether it is a transcendent experience, for a woman who wants a child. The
question is how burdensome it is for a woman who does not want a child." Id.
147. See HENRY P. DAVID ET AL., BORN UNWANTED: DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF DE-
NIED ABORTION 77 (1988); Zdenek Dytrych et al., Children Born to Women Denied Abortion, 7
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 165, 171 (1975).
148. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 169, 169 (1988).
149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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ble compared with the incomparably greater role of the female in conceiv-
ing, gestating, and birthing a human child.
However, the apparent desire of abortion rights advocates is to allow
women to be like men in their sexuality. They apparently reason that be-
cause a man can engage in sexual intercourse without the risk of pregnancy,
a woman, in order to be equal to a man, must be able to be as nearly like a
man as possible in the ability to engage in childless sexuality. Access to
legal abortion on demand is viewed as the necessary means to allow a wo-
man to be similar to a man in order to be equal to a man.
This viewpoint takes the male as its model of human sexuality and then
tries to attain equality for women by allowing them to act as male-like as
possible. This viewpoint implies an inherent and natural inferiority of wo-
men in several ways. First, by attempting to make women like men, it as-
sumes that male sexuality is inherently superior to female sexuality.
Second, by focusing on the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth and by
suggesting that they must be subject to elimination on demand, this per-
spective implies that the act of being pregnant relegates one to a position of
inferiority. Being pregnant is apparently viewed as inferior because it is an
intrinsically female state. The female's ability to become pregnant is viewed
as rendering her actually or potentially inferior to a man, while a man's
inability to become pregnant is viewed as rendering him actually or poten-
tially superior.
To put the matter in blunt psychoanalytic perspective, it is implicit in
the view of the abortion rights advocate that women must inherently suffer
from "penis envy,"1 0 while men can never legitimately suffer from "womb
envy." It is therefore those who advocate the necessity of abortion rights
for women, rather than those who oppose them, who actually possess an
antifemale "animus."
The attempt to "equalize" women and men through abortion relegates
women to perpetual inferiority. Women can never become completely
male-like in their sexuality through the act of abortion. The price of at-
tempting to become male-like through abortion, moreover, is high for many
women. Reports gathered by neutral, abortion-rights, and pro-life re-
searchers indicate that a significant percentage of women characterize their
abortion as killing. 1 ' For example, a 1989 national poll conducted by the
150. See Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, in BASIC WRITINGS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 553, 595 (A. Brill ed. & trans., 1938).
151. See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, THE AMBIVALENCE OF ABORTION 61, 64, 75, 84, 90, 99-
100, 222, 235 (1978); DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN, SILENT No MORE 79, 146, 149
(1987); MARY K. ZIMMERMAN, PASSAGE THROUGH ABORTION 194-95 (1977); George Skelton,
Most Americans Think Abortion is Immoral, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, at 1.
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Los Angeles Times found that one third of American women who had un-
dergone an abortion agreed with the statement that "abortion is mur-
der." '52 For these women, the "equality" promised by abortion rights
advocates is only possible by engaging in an activity subjectively defined as
killing her own baby.
This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that a majority of Americans
characterize abortion as "murder."' 5 3 Thus, if American national policy,
as found in a congressional act or the Fourteenth Amendment, is premised
on the view that women need abortion to be equal to men, the majority of
Americans could reasonably interpret this policy to reflect the view that a
woman needs the right to kill in order to be equal.
The apparent message of such a view is that a woman must be willing to
bear the blood guilt of a Medea in order to be equal to a man. Because men
do not need to make a sacrifice to attain intercourse without pregnancy, and
because men remain the standard of equality, women are doomed to a per-
petual inferiority in which they ever grope to be like men, never quite at-
taining it, but often confronted with cruel choices between equality and
their conscience.
The equating of anti-abortion sentiment with antifemale animus ab-
surdly labels the majority of American women as woman-haters. Opinion
polls indicate that the majority of Americans, including women, believe that
most abortions should be illegal.154 Indeed, analysis of poll data reveals
either that "[t]here is no gender gap on abortion, ' 55 or that men, and espe-
cially single men, favor abortion rights more strongly than women. 156 It is
an absurd result that the majority of persons of a protected class are viewed
as possessing a discriminatory animus against themselves. Such a result
essentially victimizes a class of persons in the name of protecting them. It is
152. See Skelton, supra note 151.
153. See Tamar Lewin, Views on Abortion Are Sharply Split 16 Years After Supreme Court
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1989, at 21 (reporting that separate surveys in 1985 by Harris and
New York Times/CBS News found that more than half of those questioned said that abortion is a
form of murder); Skelton, supra note 151 (national survey finding that 57% of Americans agree
with statement that "abortion is murder").
154. See Ethan Bronner, Abortion/An American Divide, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1989, at
Al (majority of both men and women in America favor ban on majority of abortions); Lewin,
supra note 153, at 21 (majority of Americans accept legal abortion for "hard cases" but reject legal
abortion merely because a woman is single, poor, or does not want more children); Torres &
Forrest, supra note 148 (Hard cases account for small minority of abortions.).
155. GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & JIM CASTELLI, THE PEOPLE'S RELIGION 178 (1989).
156. See HYMAN RODMAN ET AL., THE ABORTION QUESTION 141-43 (1987) (men more
favorable to abortion rights in most national polls); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Poll on Abortion Finds the
Nation is Sharply Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at A1 (single men "especially strongly in
favor of choice").
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equally absurd to view abortion restrictions as a means by which men sub-
jugate women, when women support such restrictions as often, or more
often, than do men.
It is worth remembering that the feminists of the nineteenth century
were intensely anti-abortion, viewing abortion as a consequence of the deg-
radation of women by men.' 57 Moreover, these feminists endorsed the pas-
sage and enforcement of nineteenth century anti-abortion legislation. 5 ' In
1869, Dr. Clemence Lozier, a leading female physician in New York City
and long-time president of the New York Suffrage Association, brought
charges against an abortion-requesting couple. The feminist movement and
popular press approved Dr. Lozier's anti-abortion actions.' 59 This historic
feminist anti-abortion position is continued today by only a minority of
those who self-consciously consider themselves to be feminists.16
Today, the feminist label has been largely usurped by those who
strongly favor abortion rights. Contemporary anti-abortion women and
men therefore usually do not use the term "feminist" to describe their be-
liefs; nonetheless, they generally believe that their own anti-abortion posi-
tion is more consistent with the equal worth and dignity of women than is
the position of the National Organization for Women. The issue today is
not really about whether women are equal to men. Rather, the issue is the
measure of that equality. The predominate pro-life position is that elective
abortion is an attack upon all that is distinctively female about women. In
the words of one female pro-life activist, abortion is "the rape of mother-
hood, of the gender, of the uterus, [and] of the womb."' 16 1
6. Autonomy, Equality, and Human Sexuality
Many will find the claim that abortion rights arguments are based on an
antifemale bias as incredible. Justice Blackmun and many abortion rights
advocates and theorists are doubtless sincere in their belief that abortion
rights are necessary to the attainment of gender equality. The issue, how-
ever, is whether their view of gender equality is based on a male model of
human sexuality that is inherently antifemale.
157. See, e.g., JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 109-14 (1978).
158. See id. at 113.
159. Id.
160. The historic feminist anti-abortion position is represented in part today by a group call-
ing itself Feminists for Life, which has submitted amicus curiae briefs in various abortion-related
cases. Contemporary feminist pro-life authors include Lisa Sowle Cahill and Sidney Callahan.
See, ag., Lisa Sowle Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION AND CATHOLI-
CISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE 85 (Patricia Jung & Thomas Shannon eds., 1988); Sidney Calla-
han, Abortion & the SexualAgenda, COMMONWEALTH, Apr. 25, 1986, at 232.
161. See FAYE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES 99 (1989).
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The argument that abortion rights proponents are antifemale sounds
rhetorical. However, the argument is no more rhetorical than the more
familiar accusation that anti-abortion arguments are inherently antifemale.
Those who bring anti-abortion activists into court on the grounds that they
evidence antifemale animus, 162 and are engaged in extortion and racketeer-
ing,163 can hardly be heard to complain about motivational or rhetorical
attacks.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the abortion rights commu-
nity has very little interest in issues pertaining particularly to women, inso-
far as they involve women embracing, rather than rejecting, the female
reproductive process. 164 Justice Scalia once accused Justice Brennan of
choosing the unconventional over the conventional as "the constitutional
imperative."' 165 Where women follow the conventional path of childbirth
and encounter legal obstacles profoundly affecting the life, health, and wel-
fare of themselves and their children, the response of the autonomy-domi-
nated legal professorate, and of the law generally, has been indifference.
A significant body of evidence exists which indicates that the process of
birth is badly mishandled in America. Approximately one in four births in
America currently involve major surgery in the form of a Caesarean sec-
tion. 66 The American rate is many times higher than many Western Euro-
pean countries and significantly higher than the World Health
Organization's estimate of the highest justifiable rate.167 Thus, there are a
minimum of 400,000 unnecessary Caesarean sections each year in America.
Abortion rights advocates are aware that unnecessary Caesarean-sections
constitute a tremendous physical and emotional burden for women, and
present all of the difficulties associated with major surgery. 68 Indeed, it is
162. See, e.g., NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), afid, 914 F. 2d
582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993).
163. See NOW v. Schiedler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (rejecting claim by NOW and
abortion clinics that anti-abortion activists were engaged in extortion and racketeering), afl'd, 968
F.2d 612 (1992), reh. denied, 968 F.2d 631, cert. pet. pending.
164. See infra notes 166-96 and accompanying text.
165. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
166. RICHARD WERTZ & DOROTHY C. WERTZ, LYING-IN, A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN
AMERICA 260 (expanded ed. 1989).
167. See World Health Organization, Appropriate Technology for Birth, THE LANCET, Aug.
24, 1985, at 436, 437. The "General Recommendations" of the WHO stated: "Countries with
some of the lowest perinatal mortality rates in the world have caesarean section rates of less than
10%. There is no justification for any region to have a rate higher than 10-15%." Id.
168. See JACK A. PRITCHARD, M.D. ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 869 (17th ed. 1985)
(maternal morbidity and mortality caused by cesarean birth itself is more frequent and morbidity
more severe than following vaginal delivery). Planned Parenthood specifically cited the high
cesarean rate and "higher risks of death and adverse health consequences" associated with
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possible that as many women die due to unnecessary caesarean births as
died from illegal abortions prior to Roe v. Wade.'69
Those who have written of this high Caesarean rate have often viewed it
as symptomatic of a system that overmedicalizes the entire birth process at
the expense of women and their families. I"' The American woman, from
the time she enters the hospital, becomes the subject of a long series of
intrusive and often painful medical interventions. The woman is often
given an enema; she is shaved; an intravenous needle is stuck into her arm.
She is forced to wear a revealing hospital gown, and is subjected to internal
examinations by the staff of the hospital, whom she generally has never
met. 171 Often, the unnecessary use of monitoring equipment limits the wo-
man's mobility, forcing her to endure labor in the most painful position-
lying down on the bed. Thus, American women are often denied the tradi-
cesarean birth to support broad abortion rights in their brief in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S..-, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
169. Various sources estimate that the maternal death rate attributable to caesarean birth is
two to six times higher than vaginal birth. See George L. Rubin et al., Maternal Death After
Cesarean Section in Georgia, 139 AM. J. OBs. GYN. 681 (1981) (cesarean maternal mortality rate
105.3 per 100,000; 59.3 per 100,000 attributable to Cesarean birth itself, vaginal maternal mortal-
ity rate 9.7 per 100,000); see also CARL J. PAVERSTEIN, CLINICAL OBSTETRICS 887 (1987) (ma-
ternal mortality two to four times higher in cesarean birth); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at
262 (maternal mortality four times higher in cesarean birth). Given a minimum of 400,000 unnec-
essary Caesareans per year, the higher rates found in the Georgia study (increment of approxi-
mately 50 maternal deaths per 100,000 Caesareans above that for vaginal births) would yield
approximately 200 maternal deaths per year due to unnecessary Cesarean births. This figure may
be artificially high. Nonetheless, it appears likely that at least 50 American women die each year
due to unnecessary Caesareans.
Official statistics indicate that in the year prior to Roe there were 70 deaths associated with all
abortions, both legal and illegal. See VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1960-77, re-
printed in Thomas W. Hilgers & Dennis O'Hare, Abortion Related Maternal Mortality: An In-
Depth Analysis, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 80 (Thomas Hilgers et al. eds.,
1981). There are multiple reasons to believe that the popularized view that 5,000 to 10,000 wo-
men died each year from illegal abortions was a gross distortion. Mary Calderone, M.D., then
Medical Director of Planned Parenthood, estimated in a 1960 article that 260 maternal deaths
were attributable to both legal and illegal abortions in 1957. See Mary S. Calderone, IllegalAbor-
tion as a Public Health Problem, 50 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 948 (1960). It appears that the major
causes of the decline of abortion-related maternal mortality has been technological, rather than
legal. See id. (attributing decline in abortion-related maternal mortality in part to antibiotics);
Hilgers & O'Hare, supra, at 90 (Legalization did not lower maternal mortality rate but merely
shifted mortality from illegal to legal abortions.).
170. See, eg., WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 257-63.
171. See, e.g., SUSAN MCCUTCHEON-ROSEGG, NATURAL CHILDBIRTH THE BRADLEY WAY
130-31, 223-24, 211-12, 222 (1984) (noting and criticizing hospital routines including intravenous
needle, enema, shave, and required use of hospital gown); BEVERLY SAVAGE & DIANA SIMKIN,
PREPARATION FOR BIRTH 194-97 (1987) (noting and criticizing routine use of intravenous needle,
enema, and shave); DAVID STEWART, THE FIVE STANDARDS FOR SAFE CHILDBEARING 390-91
(1981) (noting and criticizing routine use of intravenous needle).
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tional practice of coping with labor pain through walking, bathing, stand-
ing, and other forms of movement.' 72 Although lying down can actually
slow labor, 73 the American woman nonetheless is kept to the time schedule
of the "average" woman. If her labor does not progress according to aver-
age rates, she is treated as abnormal and subjected to additional interven-
tions. 174 The physician may artificially rupture the amniotic membranes
(amniotomy) in order to hasten labor. 17  In addition, pitocin, an artificial
labor stimulant, may be used. This necessitates insertion of the intravenous
needle. The use of this artificial labor stimulant necessitates careful moni-
toring of the fetus and of labor, requiring the insertion, into the woman's
body, of internal monitoring devices. Artificially stimulated labor is often
more painful for the woman, as well as being more stressful for the fetus.
Natural labor contractions pass through the uterus in waves; artificially-
stimulated contractions can involve the simultaneous contraction of the en-
tire uterus. 176 Once an artificial stimulant is used, the time available to the
woman is shortened, as a Caesarean delivery is indicated if vaginal birth
does not follow within several hours.17 7 Even if a woman escapes Caesa-
rean birth, most American women are subjected to automatic episiotomy,
involving the surgical enlargement of the vaginal opening. The episiotomy
means that the woman will experience soreness and difficulty in sitting for
some days after birth and will be subject to the risk of various complica-
tions, including infection. Routine episiotomies are widely viewed as an
172. See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 257-60 (fetal heart monitor has become rou-
tine in American birth, even though it is unnecessary, limits mobility of laboring women, and
contributes to higher cesarean rates; internal monitor may force woman into lithotomy position);
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate
Monitoring, Technical Bulletin No. 132, Sept. 1989 (rejecting view that continuous electronic fetal
monitoring is superior to intermittent auscultation); ADRIENNE B. LIEBERMAN, EASING LABOR
PAIN 119-24, 190-91 (1987) (lying in bed during labor increases pain and lengthens labor; walking
and vertical position during labor shortens labor, reduces pain and need for medication, and is
better for baby; fetal monitoring immobilizes women); SAVAGE & SIMKIN, supra note 171, at 100
(1987) (Supine position can be "excruciating" during labor, yet many women report being forced
to lie in this position during labor; discussing immobilization of women caused by monitoring.).
173. LIEBERMAN, supra note 172, at 119-20; STEWART, supra note 171, at 390-91 (medical
interventions, including immobilization on bed, is major cause of prolonged or protracted labor).
174. See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 261.
175. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 172, at 191-92 (discussing contrasting views of safety and
effectiveness of amniotomy); SAVAGE & SIMKIN, supra note 172, at 175 (if labor fails to progress
satisfactorily, doctor may rupture membranes); STEWART, supra note 171, at 212-13 (arguing that
amniotomy is overused and risky).
176. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 171, at 192-93 (Pitocin labor must be closely monitored),
SAVAGE & SIMKIN, supra note 171, at 185-87 (Pitocin-induced contractions more painful and
created greater risks for unborn child.); STEWART, supra note 171, at 211-13 (1981) (criticizing
overuse of IV's and oxytocin).
177. J. PRITCHARD ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 645 (17th ed. 1985).
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unnecessary source of pain and complications by a variety of childbirth
educators. 178
American women who wish a less medicalized birth, and a lower chance
of Cesarean delivery, often desire the option of choosing a midwife as the
primary care provider, and sometimes desire the less medicalized, more wo-
man-centered environment of the home. Some women prefer a birth center,
which generally involves primary care by a nurse-midwife. Recent medical
literature indicates that for most women a planned home birth assisted by
an experienced midwife is just as safe as a physician-assisted hospital
birth. 179 Similarly, the medical literature has indicated that outcomes are
improved within a hospital setting where midwives, rather than physicians,
are the primary health care providers. Not surprisingly, medical interven-
tions in general, and Caesarean births in particular, are less frequent when
the primary care provider is a midwife, whether the birth occurs in a hospi-
tal, birth center, or home.180
The law in many states has severely restricted the options available to
women. Many states overregulate nurse-midwifery and prohibit traditional
midwifery, making it difficult to legally give birth at home or find a birth
setting appreciably less medicalized than physician-assisted hospital
birth."'1 Overregulation and prohibition of midwifery has made it more
difficult for women to find midwives, destroyed midwife-based efforts to
train, license, and regulate one another, and interfered with the smooth fa-
cilitation of backup physician and hospital services. In some instances,
states containing numerous counties with no available hospitals and no
available physicians have nonetheless overregulated or prohibited mid-
wifery, leaving rural women with no prenatal and birthing care within a
reasonable distance of their homes.1 82
178. MCCUTCHEON-ROSEGG, supra note 171, at 189.
179. See JUDY B. LrOFF, AMERICAN MIDWIVES 146-47 (1978); WERTZ & WERTZ, supra
note 166, at 288-89 (summarizing studies); G. David Adamnson & Douglas J. Gare, Home or
Hospital Births?, 243 JAMA 1732 (1980); Claude A. Burnett et al., Home Delivery and Neonatal
Mortality in North Carolina, 244 JAMA 2741 (1980); Lewis Mehl et al., Outcomes of Elective
Home Births: A Series of 1,146 Cases, 19 J. REPROD. MED. 281 (1977).
180. See Barry S. Levy et al., Reducing Neonatal Mortality Rate With Nurse-Midwives, 109
AM. J. OB. GYN. 50 (1971); see also WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 285-86 (Midwife-
assisted birth at birth centers produces lower rates of caesareans and other medical interventions.).
181. See LrroFF, supra note 179, at 145-46; Bonnie J. Butter & Irene H. Kay, State Laws and
the Practice of Lay Midwifery, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1161 (1988); Charles Wolfson, Midwives
and Home Birth: Social, Medical, and Legal Perspectives, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 957-60 (1986) (ap-
pendix including state by state summary of legal status of lay midwifery); Noralyn 0. Harlow,
Annotation, Midwifery: State Regulation, 59 ALR 4th 929 (1988).
182. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, Peckmann v. Thompson, Nos.
90-3334 and 90-3445, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, at 37 (citing Man-
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The legal issues posed by natural childbirth would seem to parallel, as a
matter of individual choice and women's health, the issue of abortion. The
response of the legal professorate, however, has been almost complete indif-
ference. This indifference is best exemplified by the casebooks published in
the field of health law. These casebooks typically contain a chapter on the
legal issues posed by human reproduction, which invariably cover contra-
ception, sterilization, abortion, tort actions for wrongful birth, and alterna-
tive reproductive technologies such as surrogacy, artificial insemination,
and in vitro fertilization. Law, Science, and Medicine, authored by Judith
Areen, Patricia King, Steven Goldberg, and Alexander Capron, contains
not a single reference-not one word-on midwifery, or the right of women
to make choices regarding the process of normal childbirth. Health Law,
by Barry Furrow, Sandra John, Timothy Jost, and Robert Schwartz, omits
the topic entirely from their chapter on "Human Reproduction and Birth."
An earlier chapter on "Regulating the Quality of Health Care" contains a
four-page presentation of a case holding that an Illinois act prohibiting the
unlicensed practice of midwifery is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a
midwife defendant.' 83 An additional page of the text contains three brief
"notes." The third note discusses the application of the right of privacy to
midwifery; the note cites cases dismissing this claim, and then cites a series
of law review articles.' 84 Health Law's brief treatment of midwifery sug-
gests that it is an unimportant issue more relevant to the specialized issue of
licensing than to the broader issue of control of reproduction.
The failure of leading casebooks to adequately cover the issues posed by
natural birth and midwifery cannot be explained by a lack of law. Virtually
every state has statutes, regulations, and case law relevant to these issues.
Moreover, such state regulation has been summarized and discussed in
ALR volumes, law reviews, and health-orientated journals.'85 The
casebooks' extensive coverage of the legal issues concerning America's 1.6
agement Audit, Availability of Obstetric Care in Illinois, Office of the Auditor General, State of
Illinois at 1, 2, 13, 17, 37-38, 47, 51) (Illinois' efforts to outlaw midwifery are irrational where 46
Illinois counties lack any obstetrical care; 40 counties lack a hospital maternity ward; and one-
fourth of Illinois counties are without any physician who will provide prenatal care and delivery
services for medicaid recipients); Janet Howard, 33% of Alabama Moms Miss Out on Prenatal
Care, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD, Sept. 10, 1992, at Al (maternal delivery services available in
only 38 of 67 counties in Alabama in 1990).
183. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 58-62 (2d ed. 1991).
184. Id. at 62.
185. See supra note 181.
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million annual abortions and much smaller number of surrogate births,
eclipse the legal issues posed by America's four million annual births. 18
6
This lack of interest in women's control over the process of birth is par-
alleled in judicial decisions which have rejected the claim that the constitu-
tional right of privacy protects the rights of women and families to employ
midwives. For example, in Bowland v. Municipal Court, the California
Supreme Court, sitting en banc three years after Roe, unanimously rejected
a midwifery privacy claim.187 The court explained that "the right of pri-
vacy has never been interpreted so broadly as to protect a woman's choice
of the manner and circumstances in which her baby is born."' 1 88
The court's implicit statement that the right to abort is narrower than
the right to choose the "manner and circumstances" of birth is illogical.
Both undergoing an abortion and employing a midwife are choices concern-
ing childbirth. If the privacy right, as the Court has stated, protects such
choices, it would be natural to assume that abortion and midwifery are
equally broad applications of the privacy right. One could also argue that
recognizing the right to choose whether to give birth implicitly grants the
right to control theprocess of birth. Thus, Roe could be viewed as a broader
application of the privacy right.
In addition, the Supreme Court, as early as 1980, acknowledged that
"[a]bortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because
no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential
life." '89 Midwifery, by contrast, has a safety record better, equal, or nearly
equal to that of obstetrics, 9 ' and certainly cannot be viewed as inherently
destructive of the fetus. To many, the inherent destructiveness of abortion
suggests that the abortion right is a much broader right than a midwifery
right. If a woman can hire a doctor to purposefully terminate the life of her
fetus, why is she precluded from hiring a midwife to help her give birth, and
continued life, to that fetus?
The California Supreme Court went so far as to imply that the legisla-
ture might legitimately require women to "give birth in a hospital or with a
physician in attendance," and in any event could achieve substantially the
same result by forcing the woman to choose between such an option and
186. See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION-U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 62 (11th ed. 1991) (4,021,000 births in 1989).
187. 556 P.2d 1081 (Cal. 1976) (en bane).
188. Id. at 1089.
189. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
190. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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self-delivery.' 91 The plaintiffs' claims that home birth was safe were sum-
marily rejected as "more properly addressed to the Legislature."' 92
The willingness to consider facts significant to the relevant constitu-
tional test is basic to the judiciary's functioning. In the area of abortion, the
Court has repeatedly based its decisions on medical evidence relating to, for
example, the relative safety of childbirth and abortion, or the relative safety
of clinic and hospital abortions. 193 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,194 the
Court relied on findings of fact, expert testimony, and published studies
regarding the battered woman syndrome to evaluate the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's spousal notification law. 195 If choices concerning the man-
ner and circumstances of birth were recognized as within the privacy right,
the means-end strict scrutiny inquiry would require courts to analyze
whether midwifery restrictions actually serve the purported state interests
in maternal, fetal, and neonatal life and health. The refusal to review mid-
wifery and home birth safety statistics constitutes the abandonment of judi-
cial review in an area of reproductive choice. Regrettably, the California
Supreme Court's rejection of choice in childbirth has been followed by the
state supreme courts of Missouri, Massachusetts, and Colorado.'96
The judicial abandonment of a constitutional role in midwifery and wo-
men's control over childbirth, contemporaneous with its constitutional ac-
tivism in abortion, constitutes an arbitrary constitutional favoritism, as
Justice Scalia described it, for the unconventional. Autonomy theory
should equally protect both the conventional choice to give birth and the
unconventional choice to abort. In the real world, however, autonomy the-
orists, judges, and academics have had little interest in helping women to
control and humanize the inherently female process of birth. Instead, they
have concentrated on freeing women from that process. The apparent basis
191. Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1089.
192. Id.
193. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 428-39 (1983); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 149, 163 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). It has been argued that the Supreme Court has mishandled the
medical evidence in the abortion context. The relevant point here, however, is that once a funda-
mental right is recognized, the Court must, under the means-end test, evaluate whether state
regulations truly serve the state's asserted interests in health and safety.
194. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
195. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2826-28.
196. See People v. Rosburg, 805 P.2d 432, 437 (Colo. 1991) (right of privacy does not include
personal choice of whether to utilize a lay midwife to assist in childbirth); Leigh v. Board of
Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987) (right of privacy does not include the
right to choose the manner and circumstances in which a woman's baby is born); State ex rel. Mo.
State Bd. of Regulation for the Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc).
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for this preference is an antifemale bias, in the sense that inherently female
processes such as birth are considered so unimportant, and so demeaning,
that the primary and burning issue is how they can be avoided.
7. Parental Rights and Autonomy Theory
Privacy's arbitrary constitutional preference for the unconventional is
also illustrated by the Court's treatment of parental rights. During the
1920s, the Supreme Court decided four cases invalidating state restrictions
on education. These substantive due process cases enunciated and applied
the principle that parents possess a substantial interest in controlling the
education and upbringing of their children. Thus, in Meyer v. Nebraska197
and Bartels v. Iowa,198 the Supreme Court invalidated laws forbidding the
teaching of foreign languages prior to the ninth grade. In Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, the Court invalidated a law requiring attendance at public
school. 199 Finally, in Farrington v. Tokushige, the Court invalidated regula-
tion of private schools that was so extensive as to "affirmative[ly] direct...
the intimate and essential details of [private] schools... [thereby] deny[ing]
both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion in respect of
teachers, curriculum and text-books." 2" The modem Court, and auton-
omy theorists such as Professor Tribe, repeatedly cite these cases to demon-
strate the age, and hence legitimacy, of privacy rights.20 1
A substantial amount of litigation has occurred in the last twenty-five
years concerning home schooling and the state's role in regulating private
schools.20 2 Despite a large body of contradictory statutory, administrative,
197. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
198. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
199. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
200. 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
201. See, eg., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986) (citing Pierce and Meyer to support proposition that "[o]ur cases long have recog-
nized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty
will be kept largely beyond the reach of government); TRIBE, supra note 28, at 92 (defending
privacy right from charge that Blackmun invented it in Roe by citing Meyer and Pierce as 1920s
privacy cases).
202. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Duro v. District Att., 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983),
cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); Kentucky State Bd. for Elementary & Secondary Educ. v.
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2158 (1980), Care and Protection of
Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987); Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Michigan Dept. of Educ.,
396 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987); State v. Newstrom, 371 N.W.2d
525 (Minn. 1985); State v. Edgington, 663 P.2d 374 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 940
(1983); State v. Schmidt, 505 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 942 (1987); State v.
Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. 1981).
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and case law,2°3 the only case the Court has chosen to hear is Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the 1972 decision permitting Amish children to leave school and
cease formal academic education after the eighth grade.2" Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion in Yoder can be, and has been, read to limit pa-
rental rights over education largely to the Amish.2 05 The failure of the
Court to apply Meyer and the Free Exercise Clause to other educational
settings has led to numerous holdings restricting parental rights, as judges
read the Justices' silence, in combination with dicta in Yoder to indicate
that the right in question is narrow and weak.
Indeed, the dicta of the last twenty years concerning parental authority
over education has been devastating. In Yoder, the Court stated that courts
"are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of a State's
program of compulsory education."20 6 In education, as in midwifery, effec-
tive judicial review requires that the judiciary carefully examine whether a
state's regulatory scheme truly serves the state's compelling interests. A
statement that the Court generally will defer to the legislature on the ques-
tion of the "necessity" of a regulation represents the abandonment of judi-
cial review. The Court, as long as abortion has been a fundamental right,
has generally not deferred to the legislature's claim that a certain regulation
served compelling state interests. Legislative claims regarding the educa-
tional necessity of a regulation are not intrinsically less susceptible to judi-
cial review than legislative claims regarding the medical necessity of
regulation.
The Court's denigration of its role in evaluating the fit of regulatory
means and ends has been matched by denigration of the right itself. The
majority has stated that Pierce lends "no support to the contention that
parents may replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyn-
cratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy
member of society .... "207 This dicta dismisses parental views of educa-
tion as idiosyncratic and implies that the state has no special burden to
203. A relatively dated summary on home schooling can be found in James W. Tobak &
Perry A. Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 1 (1982). Christopher Klicka of the Home School Legal Defense Association has prepared a
more recent summary of home schooling law. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, HOME
SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATUTORY ANALYSIS (1989).
204. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
205. See id. at 215-16, 234-36 (emphasizing unique claims of Amish); Jernigen v. State, 412
So.2d 1241 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing Yoder based on Supreme Court's discussion of the
Amish religion and way of life.).
206. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
207. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239
(White, J., concurring)).
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meet in overcoming parental wishes. Generally, when a fundamental right
is at stake, the state has the burden of justifying its incursion into a sphere
of constitutionally protected activity.
Thus, Supreme Court Justices have cited parental rights cases to lend
legitimacy to abortion rights, even as they have relegated parental control
over education to a second-class right, and perhaps a bare liberty interest.
The elevation of abortion to a virtually super-protected right and the simul-
taneous rejection of claims based on parental control over birth and educa-
tion apparently represent the specific value preferences of the liberal
Justices. The acceptance of this scheme by most academic autonomy theo-
rists represents a parallel series of value determinations.
This preference for unconventional and destructive rights over tradi-
tional family and parental rights is illustrated in cases where these two types
of rights collide. This occurs in statutes requiring parental consent or noti-
fication of a minor's abortion. Parental involvement statutes are a way of
facilitating and protecting several traditional parental interests. Such inter-
ests include the parents' authority over their minor daughter's decisionmak-
ing, the parental right to raise and instruct offspring within a particular
culture and belief system, and the integrity of the family unit. These rights
and interests are inherent in the Court's acknowledgment of the primacy of
the family over the state in Meyer v. Nebraska2 °0 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.2 °9 Yet, when the parental right conflicted with the newly invented
abortion autonomy right, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion broadly con-
cluded that "[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the termina-
tion of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become
pregnant. 2
10
Autonomy theory therefore cannot be explained by a pure commitment
to autonomy and choice within a certain domain of life. Instead, autonomy
theory, and its parallel case law, has demonstrated a marked preference for
practices that represent a rejection of traditional or conventional forms of
association. The Court has chosen the right to abort - and hence destroy
- a fetus, even when asserted by a minor, over the right of adults to make
choices regarding the birth, education, and upbringing of their offspring.
The Court has been quite solicitous of those who wish to avoid parenthood,
but little interested in assisting parents. The Court's disdain for "stere-
otypical" family life has led it to virtually abandon those Americans who
208. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
209. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
210. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
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want greater freedom in living and practicing traditional family functions
and roles. This disdain for traditional family roles and functions, moreover,
has given autonomy theory an antifemale cast, in its implicate disdain for
women who engage in traditional reproductive practices. The apparent
message is that women who live their lives within the forms of traditional
family life are not worthy of the protection of the Constitution.
8. Autonomy Theory, the Supreme Court, and the Protection of
Establishment Institutions
The Supreme Court's constitutional preference for the unconventional
has been accomplished through a policy of deference to elite institutions.
Thus, one common thread linking the judiciary's embrace of abortion rights
and rejection of childbirth rights is its acceptance of American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) positions. It has been noted that Roe v. Wade sounds
more like a doctors' rights opinion than a women's rights opinion. 211 For
example, Justice Blackmun's summary of Roe's holding declared:
[T]he decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the
points where important state interests provide compelling justifica-
tions for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in
all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and
basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.21 2
Justice Blackmun's prior experience as counsel for the prestigious Mayo
Clinic further suggest that an essential goal of Roe was the empowerment of
the medical profession.21 3 Justice Blackmun specified in Roe that the state
could proscribe abortions performed by nonphysicians.2"4 The Court's de-
termination to enforce this limitation was exhibited in Connecticut v.
Menillo, where the Court upheld a conviction of a nonphysician for per-
forming an abortion under a statute that had been enjoined by a federal
district court and held unconstitutional by the state supreme court.21 '
Thus, it appears that the primary purpose of Roe was to remove abor-
tion from the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and the legislative
211. See Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion and Sterilization
Decisions, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 53-55 (1983).
212. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1973), aft'd in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
213. See generally Stephen Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAM-
LINE L. REV. 183 (1988) (suggesting that Blackmun could be called the "doctor's friend on the
Court").
214. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (allowing state to proscribe abortion by persons not licensed as
physicians by the state).
215. 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
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process and to ensure that it was within the province of the medical profes-
sion. This result is highly ironic, given the historical fact, acknowledged in
Roe, that physicians played a significant role in the nineteenth century cam-
paign to legislatively enact criminal abortion prohibitions, specifically citing
their medical knowledge that the fetus is human life. 16 Justice Blackmun's
Roe opinion dutifully goes on to record the shift of the American Medical
Association in 1967 to standards substantially similar to the Model Penal
Code, and then to an even broader acceptance of professional medical au-
tonomy over abortion.217 Arguably, the remainder of Roe is merely an im-
plementation of the AMA's new position. 18
The contrast between the judiciary's treatment of abortion and mid-
wifery illustrates that empowerment of the elitist medical profession is a
common thread in the modem judiciary's privacy jurisprudence. The Roe
Court found the abortion choice to be a fundamental right despite a history
of strong anti-abortion legislative activity.219 By contrast, the history of
midwifery is far more supportive of a finding of an implied fundamental
right, and yet all of the post-Roe appellate opinions reject such a right.220
Clearly, the failure to protect the rights of women and families to hire mid-
wives maximizes the medical profession's authority over childbirth. Thus,
the judiciary appears to consciously or unconsciously manipulate the doc-
trine of implied fundamental rights in the interests of maximizing the power
of the medical profession.
216. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-42.
217. Id. at 142-43.
218. Justice Blackmun's deference to the positions of professional organizations representing
the medical professions is not confined to abortion. Thus, in his concurring opinion in Washing-
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990), a case concerning the forced treatment of a mentally-ill
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs, Justice Blackmun stated:
The difficult and controversial character of this case is illustrated by the simple fact that
the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association, which
are respected, knowledgeable, and informed professional organizations, and which are here
as amici curiae, pull the Court in opposite directions.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
One gets the impression, reading a passage such as this, that the two organizations could have
virtually determined Justice Blackmun's vote if they had been able to agree on a position.
219. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-41. Justice Blackmun's history of abortion has been viewed by
a number of scholars and advocates as significantly distorted and inaccurate. The point herein is
that even the history as presented by Justice Blackmun does not easily lend itself to the argument
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the abortion choice as a fundamental right, or the re-
lated argument that America has a deeply-rooted history and tradition of permitting women to
choose abortion.
220. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
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A brief review of the history of childbirth in America underscores this
point.22" ' During the colonial period, and at the time of the enactment of
the Bill of Rights in 1791, the vast majority of American births occurred in
the home with the assistance of midwives. Birth was generally viewed as a
natural process and a frequent social event in the lives of women.222 Mid-
wifery was universally legal, although some minimal regulation of mid-
wifery existed.22 New York City's 1716 midwife ordinance, for example,
forbade the midwife from assisting in abortion.224 By 1750, physicians be-
gan the process of competing with traditional midwives. As late as 1791,
however, because physicians were comparatively expensive and few in
number, and because women commonly objected to the presence of male
physicians during birth, most births were still midwife-assisted.225
During the nineteenth century, physicians intensified their competition
with midwives and largely succeeded in displacing them among the upper
and middle classes. Nonetheless, even by 1900 midwives attended approxi-
mately half of all births in America.226 The nineteenth century competition
between midwives and physicians is best understood in the context of the
primitive and varied nature of nineteenth century medicine. The nineteenth
century was a time of competition among differing kinds of "physicians,"
including "regular" doctors, botanic medicine, eclecticism, and homeopa-
thy.22 7 "Regular" physicians (the predecessors of today's dominant allo-
pathic physicians) were divided between the elite, who attended the
"better" medical schools, "and the great number of poorly educated men
who had spent a few months at a proprietary medical school from which
they were graduated with no practical or clinical knowledge." '228 Even
graduates of elite medical schools often felt completely unequipped to han-
dle their first obstetrical cases.2 29 Until the development of bacteriology in
the 1870s, regular medicine "had little to offer that was practically superior
to empiricism. '230
221. The following historical review is adapted from the Argument section of an amicus brief
written by the author of this article. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Southern Center for Law and
Ethics, Peckmann v. Thompson, Nos. 90-3334 and 90-3445 (7th Cir.) (filed Aug. 12, 1991).
222. See generally WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166.
223. See LITOFF, supra note 179, at 5.
224. WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 7.
225. See LITOFF, supra note 179, at 7-10; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 29-44.
226. See LITOFF, supra note 179, at 27, 136.
227. See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 49-54.
228. Id. at 49.
229. See id. at 50.
230. Id. at 48.
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Indeed, regular physicians used their "popular therapy" of bloodletting
on difficult births, sometimes with tragic consequences:
Salmon P. Chase, Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury and
later Chief Justice, told in his diary how a group of doctors took 50
ounces of blood from his wife to relieve her [post-childbirth] fever.
The doctors gave careful attention to the strength and frequency of
her pulse, debating and deliberating upon the meaning of the symp-
toms, until finally Mrs. Chase died.231
Another "popular" therapy applied to women by regular physicians was
leeches: "A distended abdomen after delivery might merit the application
of twelve leeches; a headache, six on the temple; vaginal pain also merited
several.
232
"Regular" physicians briefly succeeded around 1800 in persuading state
legislatures to pass state licensure laws regulating the practice of medicine.
However, these early laws proved ineffectual, and "[d]uring the Jacksonian
Era even the nonenforced licensing laws were repealed by most states as
elitist. ' 233 These licensing laws apparently did not apply to midwives, as
midwives were not considered physicians. Thus, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted in 1868, midwifery was universally legal and al-
most completely unregulated. There was extensive competition among var-
ious kinds of "physicians." Women possessed and exercised extensive
choices among a variety of different birth assistants. In addition, nearly all
births occurred at home.234 From the colonial period until the early part of
the twentieth century, choices regarding the person(s) assisting childbirth
and the place of childbirth were by practice, law, and custom a matter of
individual and family choice.
The twentieth century has witnessed the suppression of traditional mid-
wifery. Although Massachusetts was the only state in the early 1900s to
outlaw midwifery,235 other states began to severely regulate midwifery.236
Nonetheless, during the early twentieth century traditional midwifery gen-
erally remained legal and relatively unregulated. One study of American
midwives notes that "[t]he 1930 White House Conference Report on Child
Health and Protection reported that ten states neither licensed nor con-
231. I&. at 68.
232. Id. at 68.
233. Id. at 49.
234. Id at 133 (Less than 5% of women delivered in hospital in 1900.).
235. See LrroFl, supra note 179, at 27, 136.
236. See id. at 139-41.
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trolled their midwives. Six other states required their midwives to be regis-
tered, but not licensed." 237
The American nurse-midwife is a twentieth century creation that "grew
out of the midwife debate of the early years of the twentieth century. 238
Nurse-midwifery, which is most often practiced in a hospital or birth
center, is a distinct profession standing somewhere between physician-as-
sisted hospital birth and traditional midwifery.239 The confusing and con-
trasting modem laws regulating childbirth often empower the medical
profession in relation to both traditional and nurse-midwifery, by outlawing
the former and overregulating and limiting the practice of the latter.2' In
many states today it is difficult for women and families to exercise the kind
of choice regarding the place and circumstances of childbirth that have tra-
ditionally been available, despite the lack of evidence that physician-assisted
childbirth has a better health and safety record than contemporary mid-
wife-assisted birth.
The contemporary continuation of practices of home birth and tradi-
tional midwifery, and to a lesser degree of nurse-midwifery, indicates that
some women and families are resistant to the medical establishment's domi-
nation of birth.241 The modem judiciary's rejection of midwifery privacy
claims implicitly rejects the view that birth is a natural family event and
furthers the medical profession's domination over birth and pregnant wo-
men. The judiciary has manipulated the doctrine of privacy rights to place
birth, like abortion, within the almost exclusive jurisdiction of medicine.
Although privacy rhetorically claims to empower women, it actually ap-
pears to increase the medical profession's domination over the pregnant wo-
man's person and body. Once a woman becomes pregnant, her "right to
choose" is circumscribed at all points by the medical profession, whether
she chooses birth or abortion.
Physicians as a class have had little interest in frustrating the wishes of
abortion-seeking women. Indeed, the medical profession in general, and
obstetricians and gynecologists specifically, have had little interest of any
kind in abortion-seeking women. When a physician is presented with a wo-
man who expresses interest in an abortion the physician generally dismisses
the woman with a referral. The majority of obstetricians and gynecologists
have simply refused to involve themselves with the practice of abortion,
237. Id. at 141.
238. Id. at 122, 142-43.
239. Id. at 142-45; WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 284-90.
240. See summaries of laws, supra note 181.
241. See WERTZ & WERTZ, supra note 166, at 284-94.
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despite their theoretically "pro-choice" views. Most abortions instead are
performed by abortion specialists at so-called "abortion clinics," where the
"counseling" is often done in groups and the woman meets her physician at
the time of surgery. It has therefore been most convenient for the medical
profession to establish its control over abortion in a way that treats abortion
as a second-class, but often lucrative, specialty.242
Physicians, while promoting "freedom of choice" in regard to abortion,
have found it in their interest to encourage legislatures to outlaw and heav-
ily regulate midwifery. Midwife-assisted birth is obviously a threat to the
livelihood of obstetricians. Although the number of midwife-assisted births
in America is small, there are indications that a much larger number of
women would choose a midwife if midwifery were legal and a range of op-
tions, from home birth to birth center to midwife-assisted hospital birth,
were widely available. The medical profession has effectively used the law
to harass and limit the practices of both traditional and nurse-midwifery,
thereby eliminating their only competition.
The contours of the privacy right have therefore followed the wishes of
the American Medical Association, granting women freedom of choice
where it is convenient to the medical profession's interests, and refusing
such freedom when it would be threatening to the interests of the medical
profession. The contouring of privacy to the desire of a powerful and elite
profession is difficult to justify. The medical profession already operates as
an extremely powerful and effective lobbying organization at both the fed-
eral and state level.243 Modem theories of the legislative process have em-
phasized the effectiveness of special interest groups in influencing
242. See Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622, 641 & n.21 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91-92 & n.2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (discussing abortion clinic practices regarding pre-abortion "counseling"); Stanley Henshaw
et al., Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 63 (1987);
Gina Kolata, Under Pressures and Stigma, More Doctors Shun Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1990, at Al; Le Anne Schreiber, Where are the Doctors Who Will Do Abortions?, GLAMOUR, Sept.
1991, at 280.
The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey finally upheld the requirement that a
physician actually speak to the woman as a part of the informed consent process. This holding
overruled the Court's prior rejection of such a requirement in Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 488 (1983).
See 112 S. Ct. at 2824-25. The factory-line mentality of abortionists is illustrated by their com-
plaint, subsequent to Casey, that they would not be able to perform as many abortions if they had
to spend 20 minutes counseling each patient. See Mimi Hall, Abortion Doctors Fear 'Greater
Stress'for Patients, USA TODAY, June 30, 1992, at 5A.
243. See generally 152 PACs Raised at Least $100,000 During First Half of 1991, PACs &
LOBBIES, Oct. 4, 1991 (Of 152 PACs with revenues exceeding $100,000 for the first six months of
1991, the American Medical Association had the second-highest revenue, at $1,664,484; in addi-
tion, the American Medical Association affiliated with the states of Indiana, Mississippi, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania each had revenues over $100,000).
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legislation, even where such legislation is contrary to the best interests of
the vast majority of voters. 2" The judiciary, it would seem, should act to
protect citizens from the medical profession's capacity to shape legislation
according to its own interests. Instead, the judiciary has used constitutional
law to further the already overwhelming authority of medicine over individ-
uals and families. Ironically, this empowerment of the medical profession
has been accomplished through the interpretation of a doctrine that rhetori-
cally claims to protect individual choices regarding the family and
reproduction.
The same interest group analysis can be applied to the judiciary's failure
to protect the right of parents to control the education of their children.
The National Education Association (NEA) is among the most powerful
lobbying groups in the nation.24 Education is one of the most important
state budget items. State education associations, which represent the inter-
ests of the state education establishment, represent one of the major interest
groups affected by each state's annual budget, and not surprisingly have
developed into powerful lobbying organizations.246 Education associations
have generally been opposed to home schooling, claiming or implying that
the education of the young requires the services of full-time "professional"
educators. A rapidly increasing number of home schooling families have
made the contrasting argument that education is primarily the responsibil-
ity of the family. These home schooling parents have increasingly
presented a body of empirical evidence to support their view that home
schooling is generally more effective, academically and socially, than public
schooling.247 The issue of whether education is a matter of family or pro-
fessional responsibility parallels the issue of whether birth is a matter of
family or medical responsibility.
244. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (II) (rev. ed. 1989); Robert D.
Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988).
245. See generally 152 PACs Raised at Least $100,000 During First Half of 1991, supra note
243 (National Education Association's PAC revenues during the first half of 1991 totaled
$986,910, with a balance of over two million dollars; one state association also among PACs over
$100,000.); Carol Innerst, Two Teachers Unions Speak on Issues, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 9,
1990, at A7 (discussing convention of the two million member NEA and positions adopted on
educational and noneducational issues).
246. See, e.g., THE ALABAMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION'S LEGISLATIVE CONTACT TEAM
HANDBOOK (1992) (discussing organization and methods of association's extensive legislative
lobbying).
247. See, e.g., Alfie Kohn, Home Schooling, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1988, at 20 (current stud-
ies uniformly show home-schooled children academically outperforming their traditionally
schooled peers; psychological study of self-esteem of home schoolers shows that half performed at
or above the 91st percentile and only 10% were below the national average).
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The judiciary's treatment of the education profession and "parental
choice" has been similar to its treatment of the medical profession and
choices concerning childbirth and abortion. In Roe v. Wade, the Court an-
nounced the principle of choices in childbirth while simultaneously requir-
ing such choices to be made within the constraints of the medical
profession. Meyer v. Nebraska is the Roe of parental rights, in the sense
that it was the first substantive due process case to acknowledge and apply
such a parental right.24 Meyer established the principle that "liberty" in-
cludes the right of parents to control the education of their offspring, as part
of the broader principle that "our institutions rest" upon the presumption
that the child is entrusted to the care of the family, rather than to the care
of the state.24 9 Meyer, like Roe, can be read as simultaneously limiting the
practice of this individual freedom by the practices of a profession. The
Meyer Court stated that "[p]ractically, education of the young is only possi-
ble in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote them-
selves thereto."250 This language could be employed to limit parental rights
to the selection of schools and state-certified teachers, just as a pregnant
woman's choices regarding childbirth and abortion are limited to selection
of a physician who will carry out her wishes.251
Despite the numerous cases addressing home schooling and state regula-
tion of private education,252 Wisconsin v. Yoder is the only case the Court
has chosen to hear in the modem era. In Yoder, the Court held that the
Amish could home school from ages fourteen to sixteen because "the
Amish way of life is successful without" academic schooling beyond age
fourteen.253 The Court's strong hints that only the Amish have such a right
emanates from their implicit belief that academic education (as opposed to
education in farming and homemaking) can only be offered by teachers in
schools.
The above analysis suggests that the modem judiciary has been inter-
ested in protecting individual and family choices relating to education and
reproduction only where such claims are compatible with the interests of
248. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
249. Id. at 399-402; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (Parents
have liberty interest to direct the upbringing and education of their children.).
250. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
251. Home schooling advocates would argue that this language, unlike Roe's limitation of
abortion rights to physicians, is mere nonbinding dicta occasioned by the Court's desire to link the
parent's right to the right of teachers to teach and schools to operate. Such an argument would
therefore attempt to include home schooling within Meyer's protection of parental substantive due
process rights.
252. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
253. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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establishment professions. It is unlikely that the judges and Justices who
have shaped the doctrine of privacy have deliberately intended that privacy
primarily serve the interests of other professions. Probably, the reflexive
tendency of those who have reached elite positions within the legal profes-
sion has been to defer to those in similar positions within similarly reputa-
ble professions. Justices such as Brennan and Blackmun are, despite their
ideological liberalism, profoundly establishmentarian. Their focus on indi-
vidual rights obscures their commitment not only to their own authority, as
elite members of the judiciary, but also a parallel commitment to the au-
thority of other establishment institutions.
It should also be noted that the professions of law, medicine, and educa-
tion are ideologically similar. Indeed, the similarities are most marked when
one compares the liberal Justices to the elites of the medical and educa-
tional professions. The liberal Justices have attempted to further an ideo-
logical agenda that takes an amoral, individualistic position on consensual
sexuality and abortion, regarding these issues as beyond the competency of
government. The liberal Justices at the same time have viewed racial and
economic issues in moralistic, communitarian terms, viewing these issues as
well within the competency and responsibility of government. The liberal
Justices also have tended to take a strict view of the separation of church
and state that tends to privatize religion and diminish its public significance.
This particular mix of views, which is conventionally labeled as political
"liberalism," is mirrored in the political positions urged by representatives
and elites of the educational and medical establishments.254 Thus, empow-
ering the medical and educational establishments is in practice an effective
means of promoting the liberal political agenda.
I am not suggesting that individual Justices have in some way conspired
or planned how best to further a liberal political agenda. Rather, the liberal
Justices who have been most active in shaping privacy rights have instinc-
tively rejected or ignored constitutional claimants who attack the hegemony
of the establishment institutions with which they are professionally and
ideologically comfortable. At the same time, these Justices, and the judici-
ary in general, have instinctively placed the exercise of individual privacy
254. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE CONNECTICUT
MUTUAL LIFE REPORT ON AMERICAN VALUES IN THE '80S, 201-26 (1981) (American leaders
are far less likely than the American public to consider behavior such as adultery, homosexuality,
and abortion to be immoral; leaders in education, science, and law are usually among the least
likely, among nine leadership groups, to consider such behaviors immoral.); Innerst, supra note
245, at A7 (while maintaining its abortion rights position, the National Education Association at
its annual convention condemned the Professional Golfers' Association for scheduling its champi-
onship at a private golf club that denied membership and "guest play" to African-Americans).
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rights within the familiar and comfortable context of the elite professions.
Indeed, it is probable that the judiciary as a whole, and particularly the
liberal Justices, are more comfortable with empowering elite professions
than they are in empowering legislatures and political processes. Those
committed, as the liberal Justices have been, to a broad value-shaping role
for the judiciary implicitly believe in the empowerment of elite professionals
in relation to political and majoritarian institutions. The very act of invali-
dating legislatively-enacted laws based on new and evolving constitutional
standards suggests that legal elites are more trustworthy than democratic
processes. Thus, the very practice of activist, autonomy-based judicial re-
view suggests an establishmentarian regard for elite professions. In this
sense, the tendency of the liberal Justices to empower the medical and edu-
cational establishments through their activist privacy interpretations is a
consistent act. The Justices, invalidating democratically-created laws re-
garding, for example, abortion, have implicitly stated that they trust them-
selves, as elite professionals, more than they trust the capacity of the people
for self-government. In rhetorically casting themselves as protectors of wo-
men, the liberal Justices have paternalistically suggested that women, who
constitute a majority of voters, are incapable of evaluating and defending
their own interests within the political process. It is therefore not terribly
surprising when these elite professional lawyers paternalistically place preg-
nant women within the care of another elite profession, by pronouncing
pregnant women incapable of aborting or birthing without the assistance of
a physician.
9. Brown v. Board of Education versus Roe v. Wade: The Significance
of Moral Discourse for the Strength of Legal Precedent
Defenders of the abortion right have often compared Brown v. Board of
Education2"' to Roe v. Wade.256 Justice Blackmun implicitly compared the
task of enforcing Roe to the Court's prior enforcement of Brown.257 Lead-
ers of abortion rights advocacy organizations have compared Roe to Brown
by arguing that judicial nominees who refuse to affirm Roe should be just as
unconfirmable as those who would refuse to affirm Brown. The National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and Planned Parenthood stren-
uously opposed the confirmation of David Souter to the Supreme Court
based on his refusal to affirm that he personally believed abortion to be a
255. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
256. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), afld in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
257. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
771 (1986) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
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fundamental right. Kate Michelman, Executive Director of NARAL,
explained:
I must say that if there were any question, any question at all,
about whether Judge Souter supported the principles upheld in
Brown v. Board of Education, surely he would not be confirmed
without offering clear assurances that he supports the constitutional
principle of equality. Roe v. Wade was the single most important
decision affecting the lives and health of American women. It
should be considered as clearly settled as Brown v. Board of
Education.258
The comparison of Roe to Brown has rhetorically and legally become an
essential part of the abortion rights task of defending Roe in the face of
increasing opposition. Roe, from the beginning, has been viewed even by
those sympathetic to its result as a particularly naked exercise of judicial
policy-making with little anchor in the Constitution.25 9 Such a criticism
would matter little if the result in Roe was itself becoming increasingly ac-
cepted with the passage of time. The extreme and apparently unending
controversy surrounding Roe has, however, suggested that its defense re-
quires a particularly strong justification. Roe has, after all, cost the modem
Court a great deal of its limited moral and political capital. The Court, like
other governmental institutions, must invest its power and legitimacy in a
way that ultimately maintains the integrity of the institution.
Abortion has threatened the integrity of the Court in several ways.
First, the Justices have been lobbied on the issue as though they were politi-
cians deciding the issue based on a combination of public opinion and per-
sonal values. 2 ° Second, the process of nominating and confirming Supreme
Court nominees has been significantly distorted by abortion.261 Thus, Pres-
ident Bush appeared to deliberately select nominees who either had no
track record relevant to abortion or else could plausibly disavow past state-
ments. In the process, the pool of potential Supreme Court nominees was
significantly reduced. The confirmation hearings degenerated into a tele-
vised game of hide and seek as the Senators asked the nominees, in as many
258. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 363 (1990) (statement of Kate Michelman, Executive Director, NARAL).
259. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 51, at 935-36, 947.
260. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2884-85 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 535 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring);
261. See Casey, 505 U.S. at , -, 112 S. Ct. at 2882, 2885 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Roe "fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national politics
... and has obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court.").
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ways as conceivably possible, to reveal something regarding their views of
abortion and Roe. If this was not demeaning enough, the second phase of
the Clarence Thomas hearings surely brought the confirmation process to a
new low. It seems likely that the nominees, whether ultimately successful
or not, view the politicized and televised game of confirmation hearings as a
humiliating experience.
The only plausible reason for maintaining Roe, in the face of unending
controversy and its distortive effects, is that it represents a principle of jus-
tice as fundamental and basic to American society as racial equality. The
claims by abortion rights advocates that Roe is as essential to America as
Brown are no doubt sincere. Many in American society truly believe that
abortion rights are necessary to ensure equality. The comparison of Brown
to Roe, however, lacks plausibility for most Americans, and even for most
politicians.
Brown's interpretation of racial equality and rejection of separate but
equal ultimately rested on a moral principle of racial equality. Indeed, this
moral principle of racial equality has been the basis of intrusive Congres-
sional statutes reaching into the otherwise private spheres of employment
and housing. The lack of any continuing significant controversy on the le-
gitimacy of separate but equal is the result of an American moral consensus
condemning de jure racial discrimination. Brown, in other words, rests on a
moral principle that, while initially controversial, has since been accepted,
on the whole, by the entire society. Racism, of course, continues, but it has
been delegitimized.
Abortion rights advocates, however, have not for the most part at-
tempted to base abortion rights on the argument that abortion is morally
correct. They have argued that abortion, whether right or wrong, is a mat-
ter for the individual pregnant woman, rather than for the state. Roe's re-
fusal to legally determine when human life begins similarly reflects the
amoral nature of the abortion rights argument.262 As a strategy, and as
rhetoric, the "choice" argument has had many successes. Given the fact
that a majority of Americans characterize abortion as "murder," and as
morally wrong,263 it is probably the only way that Roe's policy of elective
abortion plausibly can be defended. Nevertheless, the fundamentally
amoral nature of the abortion rights argument is precisely what makes the
comparison of Roe to Brown entirely inapposite. Brown's legitimacy is se-
cure because it stands for the moral position that racial discrimination is
262. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), affd in part, overruled in part, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
263. See supra note 151-53 and accompanying text.
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wrong and equality of treatment is right. This principle does not demand
governmental inaction; rather, it has led to intrusive governmental action in
support of the moral principle of nondiscrimination. Roe never has, and
probably never would, stand for any corollary moral principle. It certainly
does not, and has not, stood for the proposition that elective abortion is
right. Indeed, those who oppose abortion can claim a kinship to those who
oppose discrimination; both stand on a moral principle that they claim is so
fundamental as to mandate governmental action.
Those who have opposed Brown generally lack any political or legal or
moral legitimacy precisely because they oppose a moral principle, nondis-
crimination, that is pervasively accepted today. The comparison of segrega-
tionists to those opposed to abortion therefore lacks plausibility, even to
those most tempted to utter such a comparison. Thus, during the Souter
hearings Faye Wattleton was asked by Senator Dennis DeConcini: "Do
you think Mr. Duke in Louisiana symbolizes a great movement similar to
the right to life movement and those that disagree with your position on
abortion, do you think there is a great similarity there?" 2"
The logical answer, given Wattleton's position that Roe was equivalent
to Brown, and her prior statement that Duke opposed the principles of
Brown, would have been: "Yes, politicians who oppose abortion rights are
just as illegitimate and dangerous as Mr. Duke." Wattleton, however,
avoided the question.265 She must have known that to answer "yes" would
make her appear both insulting and impossibly radical. Could she really
condemn Ronald Reagan, George Bush, John Danforth, Joan Finney, and
Bob Casey, along with hundreds of other mainstream anti-abortion politi-
cians, as the moral equivalent of David Duke? Wattleton's dilemma is that
unless she can legitimately reduce these politicians to the level of Duke her
argument collapses, but the attempt to even make the comparison is im-
plausible and insulting.
Thus, rhetorical attempts to dress anti-abortionist activists such as Joan
Andrews, Jayne Bray, Mike McMonagle, and Randall Terry in Klansman's
robes, while implicitly comparing Governors Robert Casey and Joan Fin-
ney to the segregationist governors of a past era must ultimately fail. Those
women and men who sincerely want to "stop childkilling" and "save ba-
bies," and who sincerely believe that women are harmed by abortion, can-
not be morally equated to those who wanted to forcibly maintain racial
dominance. Indeed, as the Court considers its options in regard to abor-
tion, it must realize that it cannot foresee any time when morally legitimate
264. Nomination of David H. Souter, supra note 258, at 404.
265. See id.
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opposition to Roe would not exist in American society. In Brown and sub-
sequent cases, the Court had an understandable moral principle it could,
and did, enforce, thereby delegitimizing all opposition. Similarly, Con-
gress's enforcement of the principle of racial equality benefitted from the
broad moral appeal of the concept of nondiscrimination. Opposition to
Brown therefore diminished sharply as the time passed. Today, after two
decades, the Roe decision is more controversial, and more socially divisive,
than it was when announced. The comparison of Roe to Brown ultimately
constitutes one of the best arguments for the Court's abandonment of Roe.
Given the above analysis, it is particularly instructive to examine the
Casey joint opinion's dramatic treatment of the relation of Roe to Brown. It
is worthwhile to quote at length, as the following may prove to be histori-
cally significant:
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive contro-
versy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision
has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not
carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national con-
troversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.
The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus ad-
dressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of
Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way, its deci-
sion requires an equally rare precedential force to counter the inevi-
table efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Some
of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional reactions;
others may proceed from principles worthy of profound respect.
But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most con-
vincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could
suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was
anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified re-
pudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in
the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence of the
most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would
subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question. Cf.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S.Ct. 753, 756,
99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955) (Brown II) ("[I]t should go without saying
that the vitality of th[e] constitutional principles [announced in
Brown...] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagree-
ment with them.)"
... Some cost will be paid by anyone who approves or imple-
ments a constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who refuses
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to work to undermine the decision or to force its reversal. The price
may be criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence. An extra price
will be paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision's
results when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who never-
theless struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law. To
all those who will be so tested by following, the Court implicitly
undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for
nothing. The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for
as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the under-
standing of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render
the commitment obsolete. From the obligation of this promise this
Court cannot and should not assume any exemption when duty re-
quires it to decide a case in conformance with the Constitution. A
willing breach of it would be nothing less than a breach of faith, and
no Court that broke its faith with the people could sensibly expect
credit for principle in the decision by which it did that.
... Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the
Court must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character
of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law.
Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable
from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to
decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their
constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for
the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to which it is
responsible.
... [Roe's] divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pres-
sure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown
only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding
under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of
law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's orig-
inal decision, and we do so today.266
In evaluating this passage, it is important to emphasize that the authors
of the joint opinion declined to say whether they believed that Roe's central
holding was constitutionally correct. In fact, they hinted that one or more
of the authoring Justices would have upheld significant previability abortion
prohibitions, so long as the provisions contained certain exceptions, had the
issue not already been determined in Roe.267 In addition, it is important
that the joint opinion acknowledged that "some deem [abortion] nothing
266. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2815-16 (alterations in original).
267. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
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short of an act of violence against innocent human life." '2 68 The joint opin-
ion specifically referred to the contrasting views that the fetus was "poten-
tial life" or "life" without purporting to resolve that dispute.269 Thus, the
joint opinion itself variously called the organism carried by the pregnant
woman "potential life," "prenatal life," "fetal life," and "the unborn. 27 0
When specifically referring to the fetus upon viability, the joint opinion
used the terminology "second life" and "developing child." '27 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia each authored opinions on
behalf of the four Justices who would have overruled Roe and upheld all of
the Pennsylvania statutes.2 72 Justice Scalia's opinion constitutes the more
important response to the joint opinion's reliance on stare decisis and the
legitimacy of the Court. Justice Scalia repeatedly compared the joint opin-
ion, and the majority's decisions in Roe and Casey, to Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 7 Thus, Justice Scalia quoted Justice
Curtis's dissenting opinion in Dred Scott27 4 and Abraham Lincoln's expla-
nation of the legitimacy of continuing opposition to Dred Scott.27 5 He fi-
nally ended by describing a portrait of Chief Justice Taney:
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze that
hangs in the Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney, painted in
1859, the 82d year of his life, the 24th of his Chief Justiceship, the
second after his opinion in Dred Scott. He is all in black, sitting in a
shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon a pad of paper in his
lap, right hand hanging limply, almost lifelessly, beside the inner
arm of the chair. He sits facing the viewer, and staring straight out.
There seems to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression
of profound sadness and disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked
that way, even when dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But
those of us who know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship
came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had
that case-its already apparent consequences for the Court, and its
268. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
269. See id.
270. See id at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2811, 2818.
271. Id at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
272. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2855-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. See id. at .. .. 112 S. Ct. at 2876, 2883, 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
274. See id. at - 112 S. Ct. at 2876 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 621
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
275. See id. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1861) reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)).
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soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation-burning on his
mind. I expect that two years earlier he, too, had thought himself
"call[ing] the contending sides of national controversy to end their
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."
It is no more realistic for us in this case, than it was for him in
that, to think that an issue of the sort they both involved-an issue
involving life and death, freedom and subjugation-can be "speedily
and finally settled" by the Supreme Court, as President James
Buchanan in his inaugural address said the issue of slavery in the
territories would be.... Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all
democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by ban-
ishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants,
even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight,
by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of al-
lowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and inten-
sifies the anguish.276
Justice Scalia's primary point in comparing the Casey joint opinion to
Dred Scott is to argue that the Dred Scott Court was illegitimately attempt-
ing to settle a profoundly divisive national issue without an adequate foun-
dation in the actual Constitution, with the ultimate effect of intensifying,
rather than settling, the conflict. Thus, Justice Scalia accused the joint
opinion of "inventing" a constitution, rather than interpreting one.277 Jus-
tice Scalia similarly accused the Court of "almost czarist arrogance,
27
" of
"Orwellian" rewriting of history,279 of succumbing to the temptations of
power,2 80 and of articulating a "Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-
tenured judges-leading a Volk who will be 'tested by following,' and
whose very 'belief in themselves' is mystically bound up in" the Court's role
as spokesperson for their constitutional ideals. 2 1 "The Imperial Judiciary
lives, ' '2 s2 concluded Justice Scalia.
The subtext of Justice Scalia's consistent comparison to Dred Scott was
to suggest that Roe's constitutional endorsement of elective abortion was as
immoral as Dred Scott's constitutional endorsement of slavery. Thus, Jus-
276. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
277. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2879.
278. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2884.
279. Id. at, 112 S. Ct. at 2882.
280. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2874.
281. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2882.
282. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2882.
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tice Scalia attacked both the legitimacy of the plurality's unbounded use of
"reasoned judgment," and the reasonableness of that judgment:
Assuming that the question before us is to be resolved at such a
level of philosophical abstraction, in such isolation from the tradi-
tions of American society ... I do not see how that could possibly
have produced the answer the Court arrived at in Roe v. Wade ....
Today's opinion describes the methodology of Roe, quite accurately,
as weighing against the woman's interest the State's "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." But
"reasoned judgment" does not begin by begging the question, as Roe
and subsequent cases unquestionably did by assuming that what the
State is protecting is the mere "potentiality of human life."... The
whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls
the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life.
Thus, whatever answer Roe came up with after conducting its "bal-
ancing" is bound to be wrong, unless it is correct that the human
fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially human. There is of
course no way to determine that as a legal matter; it is in fact a value
judgment.28 3 Some societies have considered newborn children not
yet human, or the incompetent elderly no longer so. 284
Justice Scalia is correct that Roe's claim not to answer the question of
when human life begins lacks credibility. This point is underscored by the
separate opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun. Justice Stevens argued
that the unborn must be considered merely "potential" human life so long
as they are not considered "persons" under the Constitution. Justice Ste-
vens specifically denied that the states can be said to have an interest in the
lives of the unborn absent federal constitutional personhood. The state's
interest, therefore, is primarily in combatting disrespect for "potential
life." 285
Justice Stevens developed this argument in three unusual ways. First,
he characterized the states' interests in "protecting potential life" as "an
indirect interest supported by both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns."
Justice Stevens stated that "many of our citizens believe that any abortion
reflects an unacceptable disrespect for potential human life and that the
performance of more than a million abortions each year is intolerable; many
find third trimester abortions performed when the fetus is approaching per-
sonhood particularly intolerable. '286 Thus, Justice Stevens took his doctri-
283. Id. at ., 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (citations omitted).
284. Id. at, 112 S. Ct. at 2875.
285. See id. at .. , 112 S. Ct. at 2839-40 & nn.2-3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
286. Id. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2840.
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nal denial of the humanity of the fetus to the extreme of distorting the very
beliefs of America's millions of pro-life citizens. These pro-life citizens are
not concerned with mere "disrespect for potential human life," as Justice
Stevens describes it. These pro-life citizens believe that abortion takes an
actual, rather than a merely potential, human life. Seven members of the
Court were willing to acknowledge this core belief of the pro-life move-
ment.2" 7 Unfortunately, Justice Stevens could not bring himself to describe
with integrity the beliefs of pro-life citizens. It is one thing to doctrinally
deny the states any interest in protecting the lives of the unborn; it is an-
other to censor and distort the beliefs of millions of Americans in service of
a legal fiction.
Second, Justice Stevens stated:
The state interest in protecting potential life may be compared to
the state interest in protecting those who seek to immigrate to this
country. A contemporary example is provided by the Haitians who
have risked the perils of the sea in a desperate attempt to become
"persons" protected by our laws. Humanitarian and practical con-
cerns would support a state policy allowing those persons un-
restricted entry; countervailing interests in population control
support a policy of limiting the entry of these potential citizens.
While the state interest in population control might be sufficient to
justify strict enforcement of the immigration laws, that interest
would not be sufficient to overcome a woman's liberty interest.
Thus, a state interest in population control could not justify a state-
imposed limit on family size or, for that matter, state-mandated
abortions.288
Justice Stevens's comparison of the state's interest in "potential life" to
the state's interest in potential immigrants seems to support the pro-life per-
ception that Roe, like Dred Scott, involves the denial of basic human rights
to real human beings. The comparison is made more confusing by the fact
that aliens have, since 1886, been considered "persons" for federal constitu-
tional purposes, despite the fact that they are not "citizens." '289 If Justice
Stevens means to say that immigrants must get to America to become con-
stitutional persons, his comparison again underscores the pro-life view that
287. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (joint opinion) (acknowledging that some deem abortion
"nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life" and that some believe that a
"life" is aborted); id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what
others call the unborn child is a human life.").
288. Id. at-, 112 S. Ct. at 2840 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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the unborn are being denied basic human rights merely based on their loca-
tion within a woman's body.
Third, Justice Stevens implied that he accepts only Casey's reaffirmation
of state authority to proscribe some postviability abortions on the basis of
stare decisis.2 90 This comment is apparently made to undergird his general
view that the state's interest in the unborn before birth is only an interest in
"potential life," and that such an interest generally is too insubstantial to
significantly limit a woman's liberty. Justice Stevens, in other words, would
probably adopt a simple birth standard had Roe not already adopted a via-
bility standard.
Surprisingly, Justice Blackmun approved Justice Stevens's idiosyncratic
analysis of the state's interest.2 91 Indeed, Justice Stevens's eccentric Estab-
lishment Clause view that the state lacks a "secular" interest in human life
before birth2 92 is apparently approved in Casey by Justice Blackmun.2 93
The upshot of all this is that the author of Roe has specifically adopted the
view that under Roe the unborn cannot be treated as human and alive.
Roe's professed agnosticism on the beginning point of human life is now
more or less definitively ended, at least by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
Human life in the legal, secular sense must begin at birth.
The claim that those who are not federal constitutional persons cannot
be considered human and alive by the states, even if they, like immigrants,
or fetuses, otherwise appear human and alive, is frightening. It implies that
the United States Supreme Court is the only possible arbiter of the abortion
issue, and that the only possible resolutions are that the Supreme Court
impose upon the states either an extreme pro-life or an extreme abortion-
rights regime. It also implies that the United States Supreme Court can by
legal fictions turn "life" into "potential life," all the while claiming to do so
in the name of "liberty" and "humanitarian concerns." Citizens who op-
pose this kind of doublethink are apparently urged to give up their opposi-
tion in the name of something called "the rule of law." It is hard to see,
however, how the distortion of reality by wordgames and legal fictions is
related to anything as exalted as the "rule of law."
290. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
291. See id. at-, 112 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing id. at - 112 S. Ct. at 2840).
292. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563-72 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
293. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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The joint opinion came to the same result by a different route. While
conceding that reasonable people can consider the unborn to be human
life,"' 4 the joint opinion found that such views, articulated by the states,
cannot be the basis for prohibiting abortions. The liberty of the woman, in
other words, outweighs the interests of the unborn, even if they are human
and alive. The joint opinion refused to actually endorse this balance as a
matter of "reasoned judgment"2 95 or "principled justification,,19 6 falling
back upon the principle of stare decisis. 297 In this sense the joint opinion
failed, in its own terms, to qualify as a judicial act.29' Despite this specific
refusal to affirm the correctness of Roe's balancing, the joint opinion made a
broad and startling declaration about the relative weight of life and liberty:
"[O]ur cases since Roe accord with Roe's view that a State's interest in the
protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of individual
liberty claims. 299
The primary case relied on to support this statement was Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Department of Health.3 °" This reliance appears inapt. In Cruzan,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion apparently succeeded in limiting
the "right to die" to a mere "liberty" interest subject to rational basis analy-
sis, while rejecting a fundamental rights/privacy analysis.3°' The joint
opinion's statement suggests that Cruzan may be reinterpreted as requiring
clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent adult wishes the with-
294. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
295. Cf id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (Adjudication of substantive due process claims may
require the Court to exercise "reasoned judgment.").
296. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 ("A decision without principled justification would be no
judicial act at all.").
297. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2817. The joint opinion stated:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the
valuation of the State interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded,
as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to
viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions.
Id.
298. The joint opinion acknowledged that "a decision without principled justification would
be no judicial act at all." The authors of the joint opinion would probably state that their elabo-
rate explanation of their reliance on stare decisis provides sufficient "principled justification" for
their reaffirmation of the viability line. The difficulty with this position is that most commentators
on both sides of the abortion debate concede that the Roe Court itself failed to provide any "prin-
cipled justification" of its viability line. Reliance on stare decisis to support the viability standard
is, in terms of "principled justification," like building a house of cards in midair.
299. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
300. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
301. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 (1990).
The Casey joint opinion also generally used the language of "liberty" rather than that of "pri-
vacy," but at the same time made it clear that undue burdens upon the "right" to choose abortion
received exacting scrutiny far beyond that of the "rational basis" test.
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drawal of life-sustaining treatment is not an "undue burden" on the right to
die. Further, Cruzan was originally decided as a case where the liberty and
life at stake inhered in one person. The right of one human being to end the
life of another would normally be considered a question of a different order.
The joint opinion's citation of Cruzan to support Roe, in the context of a
generalized statement about liberty and life, thus seems to imply both that
liberty can encompass a right to kill and that such liberty can outweigh the
state's interest in protecting innocent human life. 30 2 The import of this
analysis is that individuals will eventually possess the "liberty" interest, or
fundamental right, to terminate the lives of incompetent family members,
including the elderly, the handicapped, and the disabled. Given the
demograhics of American society and the crisis in health care costs, one can
imagine that the generation that legalized abortion and aborted thirty per-
cent of its offspring 30 3 will eventually be subject to largescale liquidation
when the aborted generation determines that the aborting generation have
become too expensive or inconvenient. This result, although tragic, would
possess a certain measure of justice. As the proverb says, "Train up a child
in the way that he should go, and when he is old he will not depart fromit.,,304
The above analysis could be cabined through the joint opinion's state-
ment that "the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law."' 3 5 Unfortunately, there is rea-
son to believe that such cabining will be unsuccessful. Justice Scalia was
naive when he baldly asserted that Roe "is bound to be wrong, unless it is
correct that the human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially
human. ' 30 6 Whether through the word games of Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, or the joint opinion's eloquence, the net message of Roe and Casey
is that elective abortion must be legal. This same logic, as Justice Scalia
may mean to imply, is likely to be applied to the newborn and incompetent
302. The Casey joint opinion repeatedly made it clear that it viewed the conflict between the
woman's liberty and the state interest in fetal life as the only "difficult question" that faced the
Court in Roe. See Casey, 505 U.S. at ., -, 112 S. Ct. at 2810-11, 2817. The joint opinion's
comment that "a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary over-
ride of individual liberty claims," clearly is intended, in the context of the opinion, to refer to this
conflict between the liberty of the woman and the State's interest in the protection of the life of the
fetus.
303. See Torres & Forrest, supra note 148, at 169 (Since the late 1970s, approximately 30%
of all pregnancies in the United States have ended in abortion, excluding miscarriages.).
304. Proverbs 22:6.
305. Casey, 505 U.S. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
306. Id. at _ 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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elderly.307 Although Justice Scalia may consider such a view of life and
liberty to be clearly wrong, there are many who agree that individual liberty
will often outweigh life.30 8
The debate over whether Roe is best compared to Brown or Dred Scott
ultimately is unanswerable absent a moral judgment on abortion, a jurispru-
dential judgment on the role of the Court, and a pragmatic judgment on the
power of the Court. For those who believe that the unborn are not "per-
sons" in a moral and legal sense, that women need the right to abort to be
full persons, and that it is the obligation of the Supreme Court to guarantee
women this right, the comparison to Brown may appear eminently reason-
able. For such persons Roe, like Brown before it, may appear to rest on a
moral proposition: the moral necessity of guaranteeing women the full and
equal status of full personhood, just as Brown guaranteed and applied such
full and equal status to African-Americans. From this perspective, three
distinctions can still be drawn between Brown and Roe.
First, the anti-abortion view that the unborn should be given a legal
status as persons has more moral legitimacy than did the segregationist
view that African-Americans are inferior and should by law be kept sepa-
rate. This difficulty in morally stigmatizing the opposition to Roe is often
met by the accusation that pro-lifers really care about subjugating women
rather than protecting fetal life. 3°9 This accusation again underscores the
legal and moral attempts to brand pro-life activists as Klansmen. The cog-
nitive dissonance created by objections to Roe creates a tremendous tempta-
tion to distort pro-life motivations and ultimately to libel and crush pro-life
opposition.
Second, Roe is different from Brown because opposition to it has grown
more, rather than less, intense with the passage of two decades. The abor-
tion rights response, as reflected in the joint opinion in Casey, is to naively
hope that such dissent will, if faced with constancy, dissipate. A second
response is the legal and political campaign to crush pro-life activism.
Third, the comparison of Brown to Roe is imperfect because Brown is
anchored in the text and history of the Constitution, whereas Roe appears
to be a recent judicial addition to the Constitution. The Fourteenth
307. Justice Scalia commented: "Some societies have considered newborn children not yet
human, or the incompetent elderly no longer so." Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2875.
308. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are Not Justified By Reference to Gen-
der Equality: A Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 621, 641-46 (1990) (discuss-
ing and critiquing views of Laurence Tribe and Judith Jarvis Thomson that justify legal abortion
even if fetus is considered a person).
309. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 28, at 115, 132, 231-38 (1990) (arguing that most people who
are anti-abortion are not really motivated by concern for the fetus).
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Amendment is textually and historically concerned primarily with the prin-
ciple of racial equality. The Court has a legitimate, if not exclusive, 10 role
in interpreting and applying the Constitution's commitment to racial equal-
ity. It is not easy to see where the Court derives the jurisdiction to settle the
conflict between the abortion rights and anti-abortion movements. The
abortion rights response has been to read their moral, philosophical, and
ideological presuppositions, even their implicit Sartrean existentialism, into
the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause.
Thus, from an abortion rights perspective the comparison of Brown to
Roe is morally plausible, or even compelling, but pragmatically strained.
The repeated pro-life comparisons of Roe to Dred Scott are also morally
compelling, based on the pro-life presuppositions that the unborn are mor-
ally equal to the born and that woman's dignity and equality is furthered,
rather than hindered, through legal protection of the unborn. 11 Both Dred
Scott and Roe stretched the Court's authority while subjugating and dehu-
manizing a powerless group of human beings. Ultimately, women, like
slaveowners, dehumanize themselves through the dehumanization of
others. Pro-lifers, in other words, view themselves as the abolitionists of the
late twentieth century.
Nineteenth-century abolitionists held a variety of views of the Constitu-
tion. The most radical group accepted the textual and historical evidence
that the Constitution validated and protected slavery, and concluded that
the Constitution was "a covenant with death and an agreement with
hell." '12 Others engaged in "redemptive constitutionalism" by interpreting
the Constitution as anti-slavery in its deepest principles.3 13 Those opposing
Roe have overwhelmingly adopted the second option of redemptive consti-
tutionalism, relying on the lack of any textual or historical evidence indicat-
ing that the Constitution protects abortion rights. Casey's five to four
partial reaffirmation of Roe will not in itself change pro-life efforts to "re-
deem" the Constitution by working for the overruling of Roe.
If, however, subsequent Supreme Court appointments and decisions in
the next several years make it apparent that Roe will substantially survive
310. See, eg., U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
311. See, e.g., Robert Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the
Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815, 832 (1986) (The pro-life movement's reading of Roe v.
Wade as the Dred Scott of our day is plausible and significant.); Charles Rice, The Dred Scott
Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. Rv. 1059 (1973).
312. Abortion and a Nation at War, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1992, at 13 (quoting anti-slavery
abolitionist view of the Constitution).
313. See generally Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35-40 (1983)
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for another generation, the pro-life attitude may change. It is not that op-
position to Roe will cease; it is just that redemptive constitutionalism will be
eclipsed by more radical views. Abortion abolitionists will cease to perceive
themselves as a part of this nation, in the full sense. This group, comprising
perhaps twenty percent of the nation,31 4 can no more accept elective abor-
tion than the abolitionists of the nineteenth century could accept slavery.
They can no more accept a nation that is "pro-choice" regarding abortion
than the nineteenth century abolitionists could accept the principle that
slaveholding was a question of individual choice.
Pro-life leaders recognize, of course, that the return of the abortion issue
to the political process would not guarantee the unborn equality before the
law. Abortion abolitionists, like the slavery abolitionists, need the hope of
progress and the opportunity to work for change, rather than final victory,
to keep them connected to the country. Dred Scott undermined the hope
that slavery could be geographically contained and ultimately extinguished.
Roe similarly undid the national process of political compromise. If Roe
comes to look so firmly entrenched as to be a permanent part of our Consti-
tution, then abortion abolitionists will reject that Constitution.
The result for the rule of law of such a rejection would be quite negative.
Members of the strongly pro-life minority come primarily from the hard-
working, patriotic, law-abiding and stable middle classes of America: the
classes that successfully raise children, provide goods and services, and pay
the taxes. This class is increasingly being asked to bear the burdens of the
failures of government, the abuses of the rich, and the desperation of the
underclass. Their willingness and capacity to give is already being stretched
close to the breaking point. If the Constitution is permanently made an
abortion rights covenant, 315 the country will, for all practical purposes, lose
314. Opinion polls indicate that the majority of Americans, when asked about specific situa-
tions in which abortion should be legal, indicate that the majority of abortions should be prohib-
ited. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. However, the percentage of the population that
both perceives itself as strongly anti-abortion, and perceives abortion as an important issue, is
obviously a much smaller percentage of the population. The variety of results in opinion polling,
based on differences in wording and approach, appears to validate the view that the anti-abortion
and the abortion rights positions each command the strong adherence of approximately 20% to
30% of the population. These national figures, moreover, mask a good deal of geographical varia-
tion. The middle group, nationally representing 40% to 60% of the population, are apparently
highly ambivalent about abortion and its legalization. This ambivalence apparently makes it diffi-
cult for them to strongly identify with either the anti-abortion or the abortion rights communities.
Thus, I have estimated that approximately 20% of the population can fairly be characterized as
abortion abolitionists: Those who self-consciously view themselves as "pro-life," and who view
the issue as critically important to the meaning of America.
315. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _ -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992) Ooint
opinion) (interpreting the Constitution as a "covenant").
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them. You cannot successfully ask a people to build upon what they regard
as a compact with death.
By contrast, if Roe were overruled in the sense of returning the issue to
the political process, both sides would possess a level playing field. Cer-
tainly there would be disillusionment among those who believe that our
national covenant must include abortion rights. This disillusionment would
be lessened by the fact that the abortion rights advocates, for legislative and
political purposes, have chosen to treat Casey as an overruling of Roe. The
disillusionment would also be tempered by the opportunity to work through
the political process for the cause of abortion rights. Neither side would
lack the hope of progress and the opportunity to work for their cause.
10. The Future of Autonomy Theory and Privacy in a Splintered
Supreme Court
Autonomy theory, therefore, has three primary roots. First, autonomy
theory has read its preeminent valuation of individual autonomy and its
corresponding view of the human person into the "liberty" protected by the
Due Process Clause. Second, autonomy theory's relatively abstract attach-
ment to choice has been colored by an apparent bias against inherently or
traditionally female functions, such as pregnancy and birth. The latter bias
is apparently a part of a broader bias against forms of human association
found in the traditional family. Third, autonomy theory has been influ-
enced by the activist Justices' high regard for their own authority, as repre-
sentatives of an elite profession, and also by their correspondingly high
regard for the establishmentarian professions of medicine and education.
A truly interpretivist Supreme Court would repudiate, over the course
of time, all three roots of autonomy theory, because they have no root in the
history, language, structure, or intent of the Constitution. The existentialist
vision of individual persons creating themselves and their morality through
their choices, and corresponding limitations on governmental authority, are
contrary to the predominate understandings of liberty and government dur-
ing the course of American history from the colonial era through the first
half of the twentieth century.316 Even today, the definition of liberty as
radical autonomy represents the controversial views of certain segments of
society, rather than the accepted conventional standard of the nation."1 7
The preference for the unconventional over the conventional, for abortion
316. See generally MICHAEL G. KAMMEN, SPHERES OF LIBERTY (1986); JOHN PHILLIP
REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988).
317. See, ag., CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, supra note 254, at 201-
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over childbirth, for male models of sexuality over traditionally female func-
tions, is similarly discordant with, and contrary to, predominant under-
standings and values throughout the course of American history. Finally,
the elevation of the elite professions of law, medicine, and education above
that of individual and family choice, and above that of the democratic pro-
cess, can hardly be considered to be firmly rooted and accepted in Ameri-
can history and tradition, despite its prevalence at various times. The
popular movements of resistance to Supreme Court rulings, to the educa-
tional establishment, and to medicine's stranglehold on birth, represent
reassertions of traditional American views regarding the pre-eminence of
the family, the individual, and the legislature.
The acceptance of the abortion right by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
and Souter, even as a matter of stare decisis, suggests that these Justices are
moving toward the noninterpretivist notion of an evolving constitution em-
bodying modem existentialist notions of autonomy and freedom. These
Justices, however, will not easily relinquish their claims as interpretivist
Justices. The joint opinion in Casey evidences a desire to portray its authors
as moderate interpretivists in the tradition of the second Justice Harlan.318
The joint opinion offered itself as the middle way between the evolving con-
stitutionalism of Justice Brennan and Justice Black's complete rejection of
substantive due process.
The Casey joint opinion methodology, however, is indistinguishable
from the methodology of Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Both the joint
opinion and the liberal Justices infuse existentialist notions of "liberty" into
the nineteenth century text of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both freely dis-
regard deeply rooted American traditions, including traditions embodied by
the specific and universal prohibition of a claimed "liberty." Both feel com-
fortable in constitutionalizing a highly individualistic concept of marriage
and family, despite its dissonance with common law and other legal and
cultural traditions. Both feel comfortable with the Court as the arbiter and
balancer of conflicts between liberty and life. Both, in essence, are quite
comfortable with the Justices imposing their personal views of very per-
sonal subjects, including marriage, the family, abortion, liberty, and life,
upon the people of this nation.319
318. Thus, the joint opinion repeatedly quotes Justice Harlan with approval. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J, dissenting)); id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
319. The joint opinion stated that "[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to man-
date our own moral code." Casey, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2806. Of course this is true, in the
sense that the Constitution does not permit judges to enact legislation based upon their personal
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The joint opinion's disdain for history as constraining text is illustrated
by its astonishing claim that absent Roe, the Constitution would permit
forced abortion.320 In contrast, Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman
clearly stated that substantive due process analysis must "be built upon"
the people's legal, moral, and cultural traditions; thus, Justice Harlan con-
stitutionally protected marital intimacy while maintaining the constitu-
tional validity of laws proscribing adultery, fornication, and homosexual
sodomy.321 Justice Harlan's methodology would permit a constitutional
distinction between forced abortion and abortion prohibitions based on the
different legal, moral, and cultural histories of voluntary childbirth and
elective abortion. Even today, can anyone doubt that the act of voluntarily
giving birth, and the act of electing an abortion, evoke very different moral
responses from the vast majority of Americans? The substantive due pro-
cess legacy of cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska,322 Skinner v. Oklahoma,323
and Griswold v. Connecticut324 provides ample means for prohibiting the
state from interfering with the liberty to give birth, without any necessary
resort to Roe, under Justice Harlan's methodology.
By contrast, the joint opinion's inability to perceive even the possibility
of a constitutional distinction between forced abortion and prohibited abor-
tion bespeaks adoption, at a profound level of analysis, of an autonomy
view of liberty, under which historical, legal, and moral distinctions be-
tween various actions are swept away by the demand for "choice." Under
this methodology, once a "subject" is included as a constitutional right, all
choices regarding it must be protected equally. Thus, if one protects the act
of giving birth, one must protect the act of aborting. The liberal Justices
have espoused this sort of constitutional amoralism,325 while in practice
moral views. The question before the Court, however, was whether the people could impose cer-
tain moralities upon themselves, not whether the Court could impose a moral code upon the
people. The historic position of this nation has been that states possess the police power by which
the state legislatures can prohibit certain conduct based upon the morality of the people. The
substantive due process methodology employed and endorsed by the joint opinion permitted the
Justices to use their own "reasoned judgment" to set aside these legislative reflections of the peo-
ple's morality. This "reasoned judgment," moreover, was not limited by the history and tradi-
tions of the American people. This acceptance of the Justice's use of "reasoned judgment" to
overrule the history and traditions of the people, and the democratically-created acts of the states,
represents nothing short of the imposition of the Justice's views upon the nation.
320. See Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
321. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
322. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
323. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
324. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
325. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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favoring the unconventional over the conventional.3 26 Justice Harlan, how-
ever, rejected both neutrality regarding "subjects" and favoritism for the
"unconventional" in favor of respect for the moral and legal traditions of
the American people. The joint opinion's consistent rejection of these kinds
of moral and legal traditions indicates that their claim to the mantle of
Justice Harlan is profoundly flawed.
It is true that the personal and political views of Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter are more "moderate" or less "liberal" than those of
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. This is extremely important
given the methodological willingness to read personal and political views
into the Constitution. The authors of the joint opinion could express this
"moderation" by limiting Casey's precedential weight to the subject of abor-
tion. The joint opinion's reliance on the precedential weight of Roe, cou-
pled with their statement that the abortion choice implicates liberty in a
"unique" way,327 could be used to distinguish Casey from issues such as
consensual adult sexuality or physician-assisted suicide. In this manner, the
apparent inconsistency between the respective results and methodologies of
Roe and Hardwick could continue indefinitely. It may simply be that gay
men do not command the sympathy of these three individual Justices to the
same degree as abortion-seeking women.
However, it seems more likely that th joint opinion's acceptance of an
autonomy vision of "liberty," coupled with its generalized preference for
"liberty" over "life," will reverberate throughout the law. The difficult
legal and moral issues present at the end of life are likely to be profoundly
influenced by the assumptions and methodologies of the Casey joint opin-
ion. The joint opinion's vision of the role of the Court in itself has implica-
tions for the entire range of constitutional issues. Thus, the joint opinion's
premise that "any error in Roe is unlikely to have serious ramifications in
future cases"3 28 appears seriously misguided. If you accept the joint opin-
ion's contention that Roe is the most controversial and significant precedent
since Brown,329 it surely makes a profound difference whether or not it was
correctly decided. The Supreme Court cannot err in the most important
case in the last twenty years, and expect that nothing will come of it. Thus,
if there is error in Roe, and in Casey's partial reaffirmation of Roe, that
error will have profound implications for the future of the Court.
326. See supra notes 164-210 and accompanying text.
327. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S .... 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
328. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
329. See id. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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It is still possible to hope that Casey will someday be replaced by a true
form of moderate interpretivism, a true middle way between the evolving
constitutionalism of Justice Brennan and Justice Black's rejection of sub-
stantive due process. Toward that end, the following section critiques no-
privacy theory, as a prelude to a sympathetic portrayal of that moderate
interpretivism.
C. Interpretivism and the No-Privacy Theory
1. Principles and Presuppositions of the No-Privacy Theory
Eminent Justices and scholars have argued against the legitimacy of
substantive due process and its modem version, the right of privacy. Justice
Holmes rejected substantive due process in its application to both econom-
ics and parental rights. 3 0 Justice Black argued that Lochner v. New York,
Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Griswold v. Connecticut
were equally flawed and illegitimate.331 More recently, John Hart Ely and
Judge Bork have championed the view that the Due Process Clause is
purely procedural and has no substantive component.332
These rejections of substantive due process share several themes. First,
all argue that the reading of unenumerated substantive rights into the Con-
stitution is undemocratic; it allows Justices to invalidate laws based on the
Justices' personal moral or political views. Judicial review is viewed as le-
gitimate, and consistent with democracy, only if the Justices are truly inter-
preting a prior agreement of the political community, embodied in the
Constitution, not to enforce certain kinds of laws. It is hard enough, it is
argued, to objectively interpret the phrases of the Constitution explicitly
granting rights; allowing judges to invent new rights will make it impossible
to maintain even the pretense that the Constitution is not being altered to
suit the personal desires of the Justices.333
Second, this "democracy" theme is almost invariably accompanied by a
"positivism" theme. When Justice Black discussed substantive due process,
he repeatedly labeled it, with some apparent derision, "natural law" due
process. 334 Justice Holmes's articulation of a positivist philosophy of law is
a basic part of the intellectual history of American law. John Hart Ely's
330. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
331. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
332. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31-32 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRusT 14-21 (1980).
333. See, eg., ELY, supra note 332 at 1-104. See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-27
(Black, J., dissenting).
334. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511 n.3, 515-17 n.10, 524 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Democracy and Distrust took a mere seven pages to dismiss the view that
natural law could serve as a basis for identifying fundamental rights.335
Ely's disdain for natural law led him to compare it to a ghost: an outmoded
concept that our society "no longer believes in.,,336 Judge Bork's rejection
of natural law argumentation in law is similarly clear.337
The third theme concerns the competency of judges. Judges, it is said,
are not endowed with any superior ability or training in moral philosophy
or public policy analysis. Even if one wanted government by philosopher-
kings, a panel of lawyers would make an extremely poor choice. Judges
similarly lack any special competency, particularly as compared to legisla-
tors, in evaluating the changing values and views of the people. Therefore,
even though government must change with the people, judicial invalidation
of legislative choices is an illogical way to ensure that laws reflect popular
sentiment. Lawyers and judges are good at interpretating words and princi-
ples and applying them to real-life conflicts; they are good at issues of pro-
cess, the means by which disputes regarding values, goods, and services are
mediated and settled.338
These themes lead to the conclusion that the Constitution is merely one
kind of positive law. "Constitutional" interpretation becomes the applica-
tion of the principles contained in the text of the Constitution to particular
controversies; it excludes by definition the discovery of principles not ex-
plicitly enumerated in the text. No-privacy theorists recognize that the
Constitution contains some principles more general than the average stat-
ute-in the famous words of Chief Justice Marshall, "It is a constitution we
are expounding." '339 They similarly acknowledge that there is a certain de-
gree of indeterminacy in the process of applying broad principles to specific
controversies. The art of judging is viewed as the discipline of discovering
the principles intended by the lawmakers and applying those principles to
specific facts. Originalists generally are willing to contradict the views of
the lawmakers as to the implications of a principle for specific controver-
sies: for example, the implications of racial equality to the field of public
education. The essence of no-privacy originalism is therefore the refusal to
335. ELY, supra note 332, at 48-54.
336. Id. at 39.
337. BORK, supra note 332, at 66-67, 209-10.
338. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 332, at 102; McConnell, supra note 98, at 1534-37 (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)).
339. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819) (emphasis added).
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discover unenumerated principles, and especially unenumerated fundamen-
tal rights, in the Constitution.3"
The writings of no-privacy advocates reveal that their primary value is
often a certain theory of American democracy. Indeed, no-privacy theo-
rists sometimes value their vision of constitutional democracy above the
actual written constitution.3 41 Ely, for example, admits that several consti-
tutional provisions, particularly the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Ninth Amendment, are so open-ended as
to invite future generations, and judges, to give them content.342 Ely makes
it clear that, where necessary, democracy trumps the written constitution:
"If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's
open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly in-
consistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, re-
sponsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts
simply should stay away from them., 343
To be fair, Ely believes that interpreting open-ended provisions in a
"representation-reinforcement" manner can be termed the "ultimate inter-
pretivism,"' 3 4 because it applies the design of the Constitution as a whole to
the open-ended provisions. However, even Ely admits that his argument
from "the general contours of the Constitution is necessarily a qualified
one," and that his theory's consistency with democratic theory is "if any-
thing more important.... ,,345 Ely suggests, moreover, that in rejecting
unenumerated rights Justice Black "rejected the counsel of text and histori-
cal purpose and turned to his own vision of what is right, [and] began to
engage in his own brand of noninterpretivism. ' ' 346 Ely thereby acknowl-
edges what seems obvious: Justice Black's ultimate touchstone, despite his
protestations, was a certain vision of democracy, rather than the written
Constitution itself.
No-privacy theorists generally share a number of factual premises.
First, no-privacy theorists presume that the rejection of unenumerated
rights will actually restrain the judiciary. On the surface, this claim seems
plausible; presumably one can run farther afield with the right to invent
340. See, eg., BORK, supra note 332, at 74-83, 143-60; McConnell, supra note 98, at 1524-25,
1535-36.
341. But see McConnell, supra note 98, at 1525 (Greatest appeal oforiginalism is not compat-
ibility with democracy but rather that the Constitution "is an elegant and profound statement of a
highly attractive conception of government.").
342. See ELY, supra note 332, at 22-41.
343. Id. at 41.
344. Id. at 88.
345. Id. at 101.
346. Id. at 28, 31.
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new principles than one can if restricted to interpreting a limited number of
preexisting principles. Nonetheless, as respected a jurist as the second Jus-
tice Harlan rejected this factual premise. Thus, Justice Harlan's Griswold
concurrence stated:
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial "self re-
straint" is an indispensable ingredient of sound constitutional adju-
dication, I do submit that the formula suggested for achieving it is
more hollow than real. "Specific" provisions of the Constitution, no
less than "due process," lend themselves as readily to "personal"
interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to
keep the Constitution in supposed "tune with the times"...... Need
one go further than to recall last Term's reapportionment cases...
where a majority of the Court "interpreted" "by the People" (Art. I,
§ 2) and "equal protection" (Amdt. 14) to command "one person,
one vote," an interpretation that was made in the face of irrefutable
and still unanswered history to the contrary?. . . Judicial self-re-
straint ... will be achieved ... only by continual insistence upon
respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great
roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have
played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.3 47
A second factual premise held by antiprivacy proponents is that the pro-
tection of unenumerated substantive rights cannot serve, in Ely's terminol-
ogy, as a representation-reinforcing measure, or more broadly, as an aid to
representative government. Ely, of course, knows that the right of free
speech, a substantive right, is an invaluable aid to representative govern-
ment. He seems to presume, unfortunately, that substantive due process
rights could never perform a similar role. This is a rather odd oversight for
Ely, whose entire theory purports to be an elaboration of footnote four of
Carolene Products. In Democracy and Distrust, Ely quotes the footnote, but
leaves out its citations. 34' He thereby avoids explaining the paradox that
the third paragraph of the note, which concerns protection of minorities,
cites as examples Pierce, Meyer, Bartels, and Farrington, the four substan-
tive due process cases of the 1920s concerning parental rights and educa-
tion. Justice Holmes, as noted above, had dissented from this line of cases,
apparently considering their use of substantive due process analysis in the
field of parental rights just as nefarious as in the area of economics. Justice
347. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
348. ELY, supra note 332, at 75-76.
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Black and Bork echoed Holmes's opinion,349 although Bork has suggested
that the "results" in Pierce and Meyer might be reached today through the
incorporation of the First Amendment.35 There is little doubt that the
laws involved implicated, in some sense, First Amendment values, and also
that anti-foreign sentiment and nativism motivated them. This admission,
however, does not mean that those litigants, or future litigants, would be
adequately protected under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection
Clause. It is, a priori, entirely possible that protecting a substantive paren-
tal right would be an invaluable means for protecting the marketplace of
ideas, and the status of minorities, from certain kinds of attacks, and
thereby would represent an invaluable guardian of the representative
process.
2. The Future of No-Privacy Theory
Jurists and theorists who support the elimination of substantive due pro-
cess argue that any doctrine that produced Dred Scott v. Sandford, 5 Loch-
ner v. New York, 352 and Roe v. Wade353 is a profound threat to the country
and to the Court.354 Justice Harlan's confidence in the capacity of the
Court to exercise restraint in its application of substantive due process can
sound hollow when viewed in concrete historical perspective. The errors
that the Court has made in the name of substantive due process are so sig-
nificant, and have produced such a degree of national trauma, that the good
which has been done in the name of the doctrine tends to be overshadowed.
Justice Harlan had promised that a substantive due process holding
which "radically departs" from the "living tradition" of the country "could
not long survive." It did not require a large number of years for Dred Scott
to be effectively overruled, but it certainly required a large number of lives.
Lochner v. New York and its progeny required more than a generation to
overrule, producing an immeasurable impact upon the workers and families
who lived under a national regime of social Darwinism.
349. See supra note 331.
350. BORK, supra note 332, at 48-49.
351. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
352. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
353. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), affid in part, overruled in part, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
354. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at_, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citation omitted) (Dred Scott was possibly the Supreme Court's first substantive due
process holding and is the original precedent for Lochner and Roe.).
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The joint opinion in Casey quoted Justice Harlan's promise about the
timely correction of error, 5' but added a new twist: Error, it turns out,
cannot be corrected even where it exists, so long as the country remains
intensely divided.356 The more significant the holding and the more in-
tensely divided the nation, the less willing the Court is to review and correct
its past errors.357 Justice Harlan apparently forgot to tell us that in cor-
recting errors, the right time is when it doesn't matter anymore. The joint
opinion made the arguments against the doctrine of substantive due process
particularly attractive by magnifying the risks of judicial overreaching and
error. Taking Casey as a precedent about precedent, we are left with a
Court that not only claims the right to recognize new implied rights, but
also claims that its willingness to reexamine such holdings is inversely pro-
portional to the importance and divisiveness of its holdings. Looking ahead
to a future of biomedical life and death issues, and continuing conflicts over
nontraditional forms of sexual and reproductive activity, one trembles,
awaiting the day when the Court again plunges itself into the thicket of
national controversy.
In addition, the joint opinion paradoxically rendered the original under-
standings of the Constitution far less mutable than the Court's later modifi-
cations of those understandings. The Court, according to the joint opinion,
adjudicates substantive due process claims through the methodology of
"reasoned judgment,, 358 unbounded by the legal and cultural history and
traditions of the American people.3 59 The Court, in other words, has the
authority to change the meaning of the Constitution. Yet, when the Court
so acts to change the meaning of the Constitution, and meets resistance, the
new meaning, unlike the original understanding, is virtually immutable.
This inversion of the proper relationship between the Court and the Consti-
tution, and the Court and the people, is a particularly compelling argument
for the abandonment of substantive due process.
Roe has been the best argument of this generation's opponents of sub-
stantive due process, just as Lochner helped undergird the arguments of a
prior generation. Without Roe, the relatively technical arguments against
the doctrine of substantive due process would have remained passionless
and ineffective. Without Roe, the benefits of a doctrine that produced
355. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2806 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 487, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
356. See, e.g., id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2815-16.
357. See id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2812-16.
358. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. 2806.
359. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2805. It is noteworthy that the joint opinion dropped any
attempt to justify Roe in historical terms.
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Meyer v. Nebraska,3" Pierce v. Society of Sisters,361 Skinner v. Oklahoma,362
Griswold v. Connecticut,363 and Loving v. Virginia361 would loom much
larger than the traumas and misfortunes of bygone generations. Casey, in
both its partial reaffirmation of Roe and its expansive doctrine of stare deci-
sis, further strengthens the case against substantive due process.
Of course, in one sense, if even in a highly distorted sense, substantive
due process will last as long as Roe stands. Nonetheless, it is the attaching
of substantive due process to Roe and the consequent obscuring of the true
path of moderate interpretivism that constitutes the greatest long-term
threat to the viability of the doctrine. So long as Roe lives, the arguments
against substantive due process will live. Only when and if Roe is overruled
and the Court demonstrates that it can responsibly apply the doctrine will
the arguments against substantive due process abate.
D. Family Sphere Theory and Privacy
1. The Historical Development of Family Privacy
The legitimate roots of privacy are found in implicit understandings
about the relationship of families and government. In 1923, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court had the occasion to recognize the primacy of the fam-
ily as an explicit part of our constitutional scheme. The Court's discussion
compared certain ancient approaches to the relationship of family to state,
to the approach implicit in the United States Constitution:
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a
law which should provide: "That the wives of our guardians are to
be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is
to know his own child, nor any child his parent .... The proper
officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold,
and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better
when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysteri-
ous, unknown place, as they should be." In order to submerge the
individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at
seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and
training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching
the relation between individual and State were wholly different from
360. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
361. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
362. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
363. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
364. 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
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those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed
that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people
of a State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.365
The Meyer court embraced the view that the Constitution contains cer-
tain implicit understandings about the relationship of family and govern-
ment, despite the absence of direct textual references to the family. The
Court chose to locate the textual protections of these implicit understand-
ings in its interpretation of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.36 6
Meyer thereby represents an acceptance of unwritten and unenumerated
understandings and rights into the written Constitution, and an identity or
association of these understandings and rights with common law privileges.
This methodology led the Court to acknowledge, as a constitutional princi-
ple, the primacy of the family in relation to the state, in the sense that the
state normally could not intrude within the sphere of the family.
The immediate progeny of Meyer include its companion case, Bartels v.
Iowa,3 6 7 and two subsequent cases: Pierce v. Society of Sisters3 68 and Far-
rington v. Tokushige. 69 In all four cases, the Court invalidated state re-
strictions on the education of minor children, based, in part, on the parents'
right to control and direct the education of their children. The Court thus
decided four parental rights cases concerning state regulation of education
in the short period from 1923 to 1927. The Court's protection of the sphere
of the family during this period was apparently vigorous.
The legitimacy of Meyer and its progeny was called into question by the
Court's subsequent abandonment of economic substantive due process anal-
ysis. The Court first signaled the end of economic substantive due process
in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,37 ° overruling Adkins v. Children's
365. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (omission in original).
366. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
367. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
368. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
369. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
370. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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Hospital,37 1 an economic substantive due process case decided in 1923, the
same year as Meyer. In 1938, the Court in the famous footnote four of the
Carolene Products case began to suggest new bases and guidelines for
heightened judicial review. The Court, after noting that governmental in-
trusion of textual rights might merit heightened scrutiny, stated:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska; Bartels v. Iowa; Far-
rington v. Tokushige, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.37 2
The Court therefore proposed, within a year of its undermining of eco-
nomic substantive due process, alternative bases for maintaining the hold-
ings of Meyer and its progeny. The Court's implicit suggestion that the
laws invalidated in Meyer and its progeny arose from religious and national
prejudice is apparently accurate. The state statutes invalidated in Meyer
and Bartels had prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages prior
to the ninth grade.3 73 The Meyer Court itself evidenced a keen awareness of
the nativism motivating the statutes. The Court noted that "[u]nfortunate
experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of
truculent adversaries" motivated the statutes.3 74 The Court's response to
this nativism was to imply sympathy with the goal of Americanization
while rejecting the means employed.375 Thus, the Court ultimately and
meaningfully declared that "[t]he protection of the Constitution extends to
all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with Eng-
lish on the tongue. ' 3 76
Oregon, prior to Meyer, had by popular vote adopted a different strat-
egy: Rather than attempting to control what was taught in private schools,
the state simply required attendance at public school. A Roman Catholic
371. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
372. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
373. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,
409-10 (1923).
374. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 401.
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religious order and a private nonreligious military academy sued, producing
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.377 Oregon's legal arguments before the Supreme
Court suggest that nativism had motivated the voters:
The subject of immigration is one which is exclusively under the
control of the Central Government. The States have nothing to say
as to the number or class of the immigrants who may be permitted
to settle within their limits. It would therefore appear to be both
unjust and unreasonable to prevent them from taking the steps
which each may deem necessary and proper for Americanizing its
new immigrants and developing them into patriotic and law-abiding
citizens.37 8
Oregon believed this matter of Americanizing immigrants to be so ur-
gent that it further argued that the law "may also be sustained under the
powers of the State in connection with its duties to aid the United States in
time of war."'3 79 The State warned that compulsory public education was
necessary to prevent, at some hypothetical future point, "the entire educa-
tion of a considerable portion of its future citizens [from] being controlled
and conducted by bolshevists, syndicalists and communists. ' 380 Oregon at-
tempted to distinguish Meyer v. Nebraska by claiming that the State had the
authority to require immigrants to send their children to public school,
where they would be taught "the English language, and the character of
American institutions and government. '381
Interestingly, Oregon also relied on a version of the Americanization, or
homogenization argument, quite similar to contemporary arguments
against home schooling and school choice:
The voters in Oregon might also have based their action ...
upon the alarm which they felt at the rising tide of religious suspi-
cions in this country, and upon their belief that the basic cause of
such religious feelings was the separation of children along religious
lines during the most susceptible years of their lives, with the inevi-
table awakening of a consciousness of separation, and a distrust and
suspicion of those from whom they were so carefully guarded. The
voters of Oregon might have felt that the mingling together, during a
portion of their education, of the children of all races and sects,
might be the best safeguard against future internal dissensions and
consequent weakening of the community against foreign dangers.382
377. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-33 (1925).
378. Id. at 526.
379. Id. at 527.
380. Id. at 526.
381. Id. at 525.
382. Id.
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Footnote four of Carolene Products placed Pierce in the category of
cases reviewing statutes aimed at religious minorities. This characterization
is probably accurate, in the sense that most of the private schools in the
state were Roman Catholic. However, this characterization misses the
broader context: The attack on private religious education was as much
motivated by nativism as the earlier prohibition of teaching foreign lan-
guages. States were attempting to use their control over education to
Americanize immigrants; religious education, like foreign language train-
mng, was restricted as a means of homogenizing Americans.
The Carolene Products Court's claim that the statute invalidated in Far-
rington was aimed at national minorities is easily documented. The terri-
tory of Hawaii enacted sweeping regulations of foreign language schools.
The great majority of these schools were conducted in Japanese; the re-
mainder were Korean or Chinese. The education provided in these schools
was supplemental to that received in public or other private schooling. 38 3
The Supreme Court in Farrington concluded that the regulations
give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential de-
tails of such schools, intrust their control to public officers, and deny
both owners and patrons reasonable choice and discretion in respect
of teachers, curriculum and text-books.... The Japanese parent has
the right to direct the education of his own child without unreasona-
ble restrictions; the Constitution protects him as well as those who
speak another tongue.384
Hawaii's legal argument before the Court probably contributed to the
Court's conclusion that the statute was an attack upon national minorities:
It would be a sad commentary on our system of government to hold
that the Territory must stand by, impotent, and watch its foreign-
born guests conduct a vast system of schools of American pupils,
teaching them loyalty to a foreign country and disloyalty to their
own country, and hampering them during their tender years in the
learning of the home language in the public schools.... 385
The Court's view in Carolene Products that the parental rights cases of
the 1920s protected the rights of national and religious minorities was noth-
ing new; the original opinions themselves had evidenced awareness of the
Court's obligation to protect these minority groups. Some, however, might
read Carolene Products to imply that an equal protection analysis could
adequately substitute for the original substantive due process of Meyer and
its progeny. I would, however, suggest quite the opposite: The Court was
383. Farringion v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1927).
384. I. at 298.
385. Id. at 285-86.
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suggesting its understanding that substantive protection of parental rights
could perform an equal protection function. Carolene Products was arguably
groping toward an essential insight: Protection of certain substantive
unenumerated rights serves to facilitate both the political process and the
protection of minorities.
The alternative view, that one should eliminate substantive parental
rights and reduce the Meyer line of cases to equal protection cases, would
hinder, rather than serve, the protection of "discrete and insular minori-
ties." Invidiously discriminatory intent is easy to find in Meyer, Pierce, and
Farrington because it is present in the government's very arguments. Proof
of such animus in any contemporary case, however, would be nearly impos-
sible given the Court's holding in Washington v. Davis that discriminatory
effect is insufficient.386 Even in the 1920s, the State of Oregon was sophisti-
cated enough to argue that mandated public schools served the interests of
racial and religious integration. States in the 1990s and beyond could give
an endless number of legitimate reasons for mandating public education, if
equal protection was the only basis for constitutional review.
It has unfortunately been commonplace since Carolene Products for aca-
demics to attempt to rewrite Meyer and its progeny as principally concern-
ing some constitutional right other than the parental right to control
education. It has been suggested that these cases are principally free exer-
cise of religion cases, despite the fact that Pierce's companion case involved
a nonreligious military academy and the national, rather than religious, dis-
crimination in Meyer, Bartels, and Farrington. Many contemporary parents
and schools similarly cannot claim a direct religious basis for their desire to
control their children's education. Parallel claims that Meyer and its prog-
eny are somehow free speech cases have remained vague, suggesting that
their proponents are more interested in eliminating parental rights than dis-
covering how to protect them in contemporary conflicts. Certainly, it is
difficult to conceptualize how free speech would safeguard the right of par-
ents to home school their children or resolve conflicts over the degree of
appropriate state regulation of home and private schools.
However Carolene Products is interpreted, it seems to evidence a desire
to maintain the validity of Meyer and its progeny, despite the abandonment
of economic substantive due process. In time, it became clear that the most
direct way of maintaining Meyer while repudiating Lochner was to make a
dichotomy in subject matter. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the "pre-
ferred position" of free speech is important to this process of distinguishing
Lochner:
386. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
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Mr. Justice Holmes seldom felt justified in opposing his own opinion
to economic views which the legislature embodied in law. But since
he also realized that the progress of civilization is to a considerable
extent the displacement of error which once held sway as official
truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other beliefs, for him
the right to search for truth was of a different order than some tran-
sient economic dogma. And without freedom of expression, thought
becomes checked and atrophied. Therefore, in considering what in-
terests are so fundamental as to be enshrined in the Due Process
Clause, those liberties of the individual which history has attested as
the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society
come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when ap-
peal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.38 7
Justice Holmes, however, had both dissented from Meyer and upheld
forced sterilization in Buck v. Bell,388 stating in Buck: "The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallo-
pian tubes .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."3 9 Holmes's
acceptance of free speech as a preferred right, distinguishable from eco-
nomic rights, clearly did not lead him to see the same value in family rela-
tions or reproductive rights.
By the time that Justice Frankfurter compared free speech to economics
in 1949, the Court had already had occasion to question Holmes's accept-
ance of forced sterilization. Thus, the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma39 in
1942 had invalidated Oklahoma's sterilization of "habitual criminals," con-
tinuing the tradition begun in Meyer and continued in Carolene Products of
linking the protection of the family with the protection of minorities. Jus-
tice Douglas began his opinion by stating openly that "[tihis case touches a
sensitive and important area of human rights."391 Later in the opinion he
explained how this right was linked to the protection of minorities:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical
to the dominant group to wither and disappear.392
387. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
388. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
389. Id. at 207 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
390. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).




Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
combined the language and methodology of Frankfurter and Holmes with
the insight, generally adhered to by the Court despite Holmes, that family
relations are special:
[T]his is not the first time this Court has had occasion to articulate
that the liberty entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment includes the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children," Meyer. . ., and "the liberty... to direct the upbringing
and education of children," Pierce. . ., and that these are among
"the basic civil rights of man." Skinner. These decisions affirm that
there is a "realm of family life which the state cannot enter" without
substantial justification. Prince. Surely the right invoked in this
case, to be free of regulation of the intimacies of the marriage rela-
tionship, "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lack-
ing when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs . . . (opinion of Frank-
furter, J.). 39 3
Justice White thereby reaffirmed substantive due process in the area of
family relations, while distinguishing economic substantive due process by
implicitly arguing, through an adaptation of Frankfurter's Kovacs concur-
rence, that family integrity, like free speech, is essential to an open society.
Justice White's view that privacy rights rest upon the Due Process
Clause has become the view of the Court, while Justice Douglas's penum-
bral analysis has been abandoned. Even Douglas, however, managed in
Griswold to rhetorically echo Meyer's presumption that the family is more
basic than the state, and thus deserves judicial and constitutional protection
from the state:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.394
Similarly, the Court's invalidation of miscegenation statutes in 1967 re-
affirmed the intimate link between the protection of traditional forms of
familial association and the protection of minorities.3 95
393. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
394. Id. at 486.
395. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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From 1923 to 1967, the Court consistently articulated a theory of pri-
vacy that protected the "realm of family life" without reference to contem-
porary concepts of individual autonomy. The Court's theory of privacy was
generally consistent, despite the confusion caused by the intervening aban-
donment of economic substantive due process. The Court perceived that
the Constitution, and particularly the Due Process Clause, protected an im-
plicit historical and traditional American understanding about the primacy
of the family in relation to government. The Court realized that majorities
attempted to use state power to prevent minorities from cultural and physi-
cally reproducing themselves from generation to generation, and thus that
protection of the family served to protect minorities. The Court implicitly
recognized that protecting the family, like protecting free speech, was a
means of ensuring an open society, a society in which the cultural orthodox-
ies of one generation are not permanently frozen.
2. Family Sphere Theory and the Rejection of Autonomy
The Supreme Court's development of a family sphere theory of privacy
was accompanied by a rejection of autonomy theory. The early opinions,
like Meyer, are so wrapped in traditionalism, and in common law concepts,
that the possibility of autonomy never arises. When the Meyer Court deter-
mined that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause included
"privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men," they implicitly, if unconsciously, excluded
abortion, divorce, sodomy, and fornication from the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By the 1960s, however, the possibility of re-
shaping privacy from the protection of the family to the protection of indi-
vidual autonomy was becoming evident. The Justices, however, initially
rejected it. This rejection can be seen most clearly in the opinions of the
second Justice Harlan.
Justice Harlan explained his acceptance of substantive due process anal-
ysis in his 1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman.396 The majority in Poe refused to
review the constitutionality of Connecticut's anticontraception statutes,
based on the lack of a true present controversy.3 97 Justice Harlan dissented
on grounds of justiciability, and then proceeded to articulate his view that
the Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional. Justice Harlan noted that
the Court had refused to limit the due process clauses to either procedural
due process or the incorporation of the Bill of Rights.3 98 He found two
396. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
397. Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-08.
398. See id. at 540-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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roles for substantive due process. First, the Due Process Clause is a bar to
arbitrary legislation to the degree that it requires all laws to be rationally
related to some governmental interest.399 Second, "certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment."'  Justice Harlan thereby accepted the view that some enu-
merated rights are "fundamental," because they "belong... to the citizens
of all free governments."' '4 1
Justice Harlan rejected any "formula"' 2 or "mechanical yardstick"'1 °
for evaluating substantive due process claims. At the same time, he rejected
unbridled judicial restraint. Justice Harlan thus explained his judicial
methodology in substantive due process cases:
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If
the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of neces-
sity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where
judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take
them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a deci-
sion which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No
formula could serve as a substitute.., for judgment and restraint.4'
Justice Harlan restated similar views four years later in Griswold:
Judicial self-restraint ... will be achieved ... only by continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition
of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of
the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms. 4°5
Justice Harlan, based on this methodology, apparently accepted the
view that parental rights were fundamental based on "the teachings of his-
399. See id. at 541-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
400. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
401. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
402. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 544 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
405. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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tory... [and] the basic values that underlie our society." At the same time,
however, Justice Harlan limited the reach of privacy to the traditional
family:
[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state con-
cerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the
physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally con-
cerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed
to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community con-
cern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times
has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding marriage which
provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and
societal context in which children are born and brought up, as well
as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices
which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance
of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must
be built upon that basis."
Significantly, Justice Harlan included abortion, euthanasia, and suicide
among those controversial moral issues about which states generally should
be free to legislate.' 7
Justice Harlan's reliance on American moral traditions to shape privacy
indicates an implicit rejection of autonomy theory. His ultimate conclusion
that Connecticut's anticontraceptive laws, even if based on long-standing
moral views, were unconstitutional, was based on the distinction between
marital and nonmarital sexuality:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies
which the State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and
wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution
of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but
which always and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is
one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-mari-
tal sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies
inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law
the details of that intimacy."
Thus, the American tradition of protecting marriage and the intimacies
of marriage outweighs state efforts to regulate the manner of that intimacy,
at least to the degree it is consensual. The family that is protected is, more-
406. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
407. See id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
408. Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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over, the traditional family, the form of the family as it has historically
existed in American society.
A number of other Justices echoed Justice Harlan's traditionalism in the
course of affirming privacy rights during the 1960s. Justice Douglas's ma-
jority opinion in Griswold ended by rhetorically echoing traditional Ameri-
can marriage vows and implying that the family has priority in time and
rights to the state.4 9 Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold,
which was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, echoed
Douglas's embrace of marriage while asserting that statutes prohibiting
adultery and fornication are "beyond doubt" constitutional.410
In retrospect, the use or acceptance of traditionalist rhetoric and meth-
odology by Justices Douglas and Brennan to legitimize the right of privacy
appears disingenuous. A mere seven years after Griswold, Justice Brennan
began the campaign to transform privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird involved the
prosecution of Bill Baird, a reproductive rights activist. 4" Baird was con-
victed of giving a woman a contraceptive article at the conclusion of a lec-
ture at Boston University.4"2 The State had prosecuted Baird under a
provision restricting the distribution of contraceptive articles to doctors or
pharmacists.41 3 Justice Brennan, however, treated the case as though it
turned on the marital status of the woman, even though both the indictment
and the record failed to disclose such status. Brennan thus used the case to
pose the question of whether a rational basis could be found for distinguish-
ing between the married and the unmarried. Brennan supplemented this
rational basis equal protection analysis with the following now-famous
dicta:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried
persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold
the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
409. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
410. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
411. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (Baird had standing to raise constitutional
issues because he was an advocate of rights of persons to obtain contraceptives.).
412. Id. at 440. Baird was initially also convicted for exhibiting contraceptive articles during
the lecture, but this conviction was overturned by the state court on free speech grounds. Id.
413. Id. at 441-42; id. at 462 (White, J., concurring); id. at 465-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1062 [Vol. 75:975
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PRIVACY
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.414
Thus, in a few words Justice Brennan swept aside the assurances of Jus-
tice Harlan that privacy "must build upon" traditional American under-
standings of morality and the family, and Justice Goldberg's corresponding
assurance that anti-fornication and anti-adultery statutes were "without
doubt" constitutional. Implicit in the final sentence alone are most of the
holdings sought by autonomy theorists: the right to contraception, the
right to abortion, the right to engage in consensual sexual activity, and the
view that these rights attach to individuals regardless of their marital status.
Justice Brennan's reduction of marriage to an association of self-interested
individuals parallels precisely the view of associations articulated fourteen
years later in Justice Blackmun's Hardwick dissent. By 1972, Brennan had
diverted privacy from its fifty year heritage of protecting the family onto the
new path of protecting individual autonomy.
Roe was before the Court when Brennan authored his Eisenstadt opin-
ion. Brennan's claim that privacy protected the decision whether to "bear
or beget" a child was apparently aimed at establishing the abortion and
contraceptive rights as an indivisible whole. Indeed, after Roe, Brennan
appeared to use the phrase "bear or beget" to refer to the range of choices
involved in contraception and abortion.415 Privacy as autonomy, then, at
the very outset, was created with the abortion right in view.
Once privacy was reinterpreted as an autonomy right, the Court quickly
moved to establish its legitimacy by citing the parental rights cases of the
1920s, as well as subsequent cases from the 1940s through the 1960s con-
cerning traditional family relationships. The Court attempted to join these
family sphere cases to the new autonomy rights they were creating and en-
forcing during the 1970s and 1980s, and thereby create one indissolvable
and supposedly well-established right.41 6 This use of the older family
sphere cases to legitimate the new autonomy was particularly ironic, in that
the 1970s and 1980s was an era where the Court largely abdicated its prior
role in protecting the sphere of the family. During this time, the traditional
family was struggling against governmental authorities in the areas of edu-
cation, birth, and child rearing, while the judiciary, from the Supreme
Court on down, generally sided with the state.417 The failure of the Court
to protect the traditional family during this period is further evidence that
414. Id. at 453 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
415. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
416. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citations omitted), a ffd in part,
overruled in part Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
417. See supra notes 164-210 and accompanying text.
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the creation of the abortion right, and reformulation of privacy as auton-
omy, was really the creation of an entirely new constitutional doctrine.
Moreover, where privacy-as-autonomy has conflicted with the protection of
traditional family associational rights, the Court has generally and clearly
favored the former, and newer, theory of privacy. The creation of privacy-
as-autonomy, then, has served to displace and weaken the Court's previous
doctrine of family privacy. Meyer and its progeny, properly understood,
support the destruction, rather than the recognition, of abortion and auton-
omy rights.
II. CONCLUSION
Autonomy and abortion rights, properly understood, represent a detour
from the Court's seventy year tradition of protecting the family. The Court
has not yet found its way back from the chaos wrought by judges who, in
the words of Justice Harlan, "felt free to roam" in an effort to remake soci-
ety in their own image. This attempt to remake society has been a failure,
precisely because it failed to honor "the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it de-
veloped as well as the traditions from which it broke." '418 Despite twenty
years of virtually unrestricted abortion, we have discovered that the tie of
our society to respecting unborn human life is not easily broken. Protecting
an unborn child is really not the same thing as hating a black man, in the
eyes of our people and our tradition. The underlying tie of our people and
our law to the family, and to morality, has further been tested, but not
broken.
The Court's recent claims that it would undermine the very legitimacy
of the nation for the Court to admit and overrule an erroneous decision
only exacerbates our divisions, by suggesting that a question of national
import once determined by nine appointed men somehow becomes an im-
mutable part of our national covenant. Ironically, the Court's broad views
of constitutional interpretation and stare decisis make the original under-
standings of the Constitution less mutable than the Court's later judicial
glosses and amendments. It is as though the people had "resigned their
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal." ' 9 The people, how-
ever, have not resigned their basic right to self-government; rather, it is the
418. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
419. Casey, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGU-
RAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong. 1st
Sess. 139 (1989)).
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Court that has seized authority from the people. The result, now as in the
past, is the spectre of a broken covenant.
The Court may continue on its current path indefinitely, defiantly as-
serting that a vote cast by seven men in 1973 is the nation's last and only
significant word on the legalization of abortion. Admittedly, the national
covenant will not break immediately or apparently, in the sense of civil war
or governmental breakdown. Over time, however, a large and significant
segment of this nation's population-a group that this nation has time and
again asked to sacrifice for the common good-will cease to identify itself
with what is perceived as "a covenant with death and an agreement with
hell.""42 The results of such a broken covenant cannot be foreseen, but they
are sure to be profound.
The legacy of Justice Harlan suggests that the way back from this abyss
would require the Court to reject the past twenty years of autonomy theory,
while building on the seventy year tradition of family sphere theory. This
protection of the traditional family is the living constitutional tradition. A
role for the Court remains here, as it seeks both to protect the sphere of the
family and to guarantee that majorities do not use the state to prevent reli-
gious and other minorities from physically and culturally reproducing
themselves. As social conflict continues, and intolerance from the right and
from the left grows, the Court should ensure that we are able both to speak
of what matters to us, and to live and pass on our ways of life to our
children.
The Court cannot and should not settle all of America's deep divisions.
However, the Court can give us the right, within the limits of ordered lib-
erty, to use our political and personal liberties to remain divided. This right
to be and remain divided, to be and remain, if desired, a "discrete and insu-
lar minority"-a community within the communities that comprise
America-is basic to what it means to be free in America. But the very
question of when we are free to be different, when we are free to be let
alone, cannot be entirely decided by any court. The very question of when
we must leave one another alone, and when we are free to use governmental
power to bind us together in a particular way, goes to the heart of what it
means to be an American. The freedom to be let alone is not always more
basic than the coercive political demands of the political community. Every
society, as Justice Harlan taught us, has found it necessary to deal coer-
cively with some consensual or solitary conduct. We all, despite our best
efforts at insularity, affect one another.
420. Abortion and a Nation at War, supra note 312, at 13 (quoting a slavery abolitionist of the
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court).
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Freedoms regarding speech and the family are basic to this constitu-
tional balance because both freedoms are essential to the very political pro-
cess by which this balance is achieved, and also because they represent
absolute limitations on the ability of the political community to squash dis-
sent. The Constitution, however, deliberately leaves many questions to the
political process itself. The balance between political cohesion and tolera-
tion is, beyond the absolute boundaries of the Constitution, a political and
legislative question. The boundaries of the civil community, in terms of the
status of the preborn, is at this point in our history by necessity also largely
a political question. The Court, in this and so much else, cannot substitute
for the acts of the people in governing themselves.
A reversal of autonomy and abortion rights, and possible reinvigoration
of family rights, would therefore renew, rather than end, our national de-
bate on autonomy, abortion, sexuality, and the family. The rest-how we
live and worship, what we seek politically and personally, how we dialogue
with others and teach our children-would, as always, be decided by the
American people. It is likely that we would discover in the course of this
debate that we are very different from one another, and that different states,
regions, and cultural and religious traditions would seek rather different
balances between community and tolerance. Paradoxically, however, it is
only when the Court allows our diversity about diversity to emerge that the
hope of American freedom will have the opportunity to flower.
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